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KENYA IN CRISIS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the announcement of the contested presidential 
election results on 30 December 2007 giving a second 
term to Mwai Kibaki, Kenya has been in its worst political 
crisis since independence. Over 1,000 people have died 
and 300,000 have been displaced in violence with a serious 
ethnic character. As former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan conducts negotiations for a political settlement, 
calm has partly returned, but the situation remains highly 
volatile. To address the causes of the crisis, it will not be 
enough for the Annan team to broker a deal on the 
mechanics of a transitional arrangement between political 
opponents and schedule negotiations on a reform agenda. 
A sustainable settlement must address in detail a program 
of power sharing, constitutional and legal reform and 
economic policies that convinces the drivers of violence 
to disarm. For negotiations to succeed, the international 
community must enhance its pressure, including aid 
conditionality and threats and application of targeted 
sanctions against spoilers.  
State authority collapsed in the political strongholds of 
the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). 
Supporters of its leader, Raila Odinga, took to the streets 
in violent protest against the theft of the presidency and 
to seek revenge on the Kikuyu and Kisii communities 
perceived to be loyal to Kibaki. The security forces reacted 
with great brutality and members of the communities 
supporting ODM were violently targeted by Kibaki 
supporters.  
Kofi Annan and a distinguished team of other African 
leaders have been mandated by the African Union (AU) 
to mediate the crisis. Soon after their arrival on 22 January, 
they arranged a meeting between Odinga and Kibaki and 
obtained pledges to negotiate a settlement. The parties have 
conceded some ground and are discussing a transitional 
arrangement which could lead to new elections after two 
years, legal and constitutional reforms, and a truth, justice 
and reconciliation commission to assist in healing wounds. 
Serious obstacles remain, however. Armed groups are 
still mobilising on both sides. ODM, which won a clear 
parliamentary plurality in December, has put on hold its 
calls for mass action and is using the talks to restore 
prestige it lost internationally in the violence. It is under 
pressure from its core constituencies, however, to demand 
nothing less than the presidency, and its supporters could 
easily renew violent confrontations if Kibaki’s Party of 
National Unity (PNU) coalition remains inflexible. 
The Kibaki coalition is buying time to wear down both the 
opposition and the international community’s resolve. It 
benefits from the presidency’s extensive powers, including 
unlimited access to public resources. It insists the situation 
is under control and there is no power vacuum, tends to 
treat Annan’s mission as a sideshow while sponsoring 
alternative reconciliation processes, seeks to have Kibaki’s 
election recognised by neighbouring countries and 
continues to resist genuine sharing of executive power.  
While the mediation concentrates on a power-sharing 
agreement and a transitional arrangement leading to new 
elections, it has postponed equally important talks on the 
reform agenda and economic policy that an effective 
transitional government should adopt. A further year is 
envisaged for these talks. This is a risky approach. The 
Annan team should engage the two sides immediately 
on these topics.  
Three complementary sets of issues must be addressed 
to finalise a detailed power-sharing agreement. The first 
are the legal and constitutional reforms needed during 
the transition period, including a complete overhaul of 
the electoral framework. The second are the economic 
policies to be implemented during the transition. The 
third are the concrete details of the process to be followed 
to end the violence and to deal with the humanitarian 
crisis, including the institutional framework and timelines. 
The ODM and PNU do not control the local violence. 
There is a chance to restore state authority and prevent 
renewed major fighting only if local leaders understand 
that their grievances are being addressed and concrete 
measures are being rapidly implemented. Civil society 
and economic stakeholders should also be associated 
with the negotiations on institutional reforms and economic 
policy. 
International pressure is critical to achieving these objectives. 
The conditioning of multilateral and bilateral financial help 
for a negotiated settlement should be reinforced by a 
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general travel ban and asset freeze policy against those 
who support and organise the violence or otherwise block 
the political process. Some hardliners in Kibaki’s camp 
depend on international credit-worthiness to keep their 
enterprises prosperous. The prospect of making individuals 
pariahs can be used to encourage concessions in the 
negotiations and good faith in implementation of an 
agreement.  
The stakes go beyond Kenya, whose political and economic 
health is an essential ingredient for the security and 
prosperity of eastern and central Africa and indeed for 
how the entire continent’s future is assessed by investors. 
Kenya’s stability determines regional access to energy 
supplies and basic commodities and guarantees a relatively 
safe environment for hundreds of thousands of Somali 
and Sudanese refugees. But concentrating on a power-
sharing arrangement between ODM and PNU will not 
be enough to restore the situation.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Annan Mediation Team of Eminent African 
Personalities: 
1. Propose to open three additional areas to be 
addressed immediately and urgently as detailed 
negotiations on the structure and composition of a 
power-sharing arrangement continue:  
(a) constitutional and legal reforms, including a 
complete overhaul of the electoral framework;  
(b) economic policies, including immediate land 
acquisition and redistribution and major job-
creation programs; and  
(c) the framework and process for implementing 
commitments for ending the violence and 
resolving the humanitarian crisis, including 
institutions, timetables and international 
guarantees.  
2. Involve additional stakeholders from civil society in 
the talks on legal and constitutional reforms and 
from the business community on economic policies. 
To the Kenya Government and PNU Coalition: 
3. Engage constructively in the power-sharing 
negotiations and take the opportunity of discussions 
on constitutional reforms and economic policies 
to negotiate guarantees for the continuation of 
reforms started by the Kibaki administration. 
4. Restore security in the IDP camps and suspend all 
resettlement and relocation policies until a framework 
has been agreed by the parties. 
5. Ensure equal access and distribution of humanitarian 
and reconstruction resources to all victims of the 
violence. 
6. Arrest and prosecute the leaders of the Mungiki sect, 
as well as politicians supporting its activities, so as 
to redress concerns about possible state support for 
its resurgence.  
7. Suspend immediately all police officers in charge 
of the areas where extrajudicial killings have 
occurred, including Nairobi, Kisumu, Kakamega, 
Nakuru, Naivasha, Sotik and Kericho. 
To the ODM Leadership: 
8. Engage constructively in the negotiations and 
support the immediate opening of detailed talks on 
constitutional reforms and the economic policies, 
to be carried out during the transition, with a view 
to reassuring PNU hardliners over its economic 
policies as well as addressing the grievances of its 
own hardline constituencies. 
9. Condemn publicly and threaten with sanctions any 
ODM leader inciting ethnic hatred, and express 
sympathy for the Kikuyu victims of the violence. 
To the U.S., the EU and its Member States, Canada, 
South Africa and Other International Partners: 
10. Condition aid on the satisfactory conclusion of all 
the above-mentioned elements of the negotiation. 
11. Implement and expand the travel bans already 
announced by the U.S., Canada, the UK and 
Switzerland by freezing the financial assets of 
individuals directly involved in or supporting 
violence or otherwise blocking the negotiation 
process and publicly blacklist their companies on 
financial markets. 
To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC): 
12. Open a preliminary examination of alleged atrocity 
crimes committed in Kenya and take into account 
the findings and recommendations of the fact-finding 
mission of the Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) once issued. 
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 February 2008 
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KENYA IN CRISIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The announcement on 30 December 2007 by the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK) that the incumbent President 
Mwai Kibaki was the winner of the presidential election has 
plunged the country into an unprecedented political, security 
and humanitarian crisis. Six weeks after proclamation of 
the contested results, protest riots, repression by security 
forces and revenge killings by supporters of both camps 
have caused over 1,000 deaths and more than 300,000 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). The loss for the 
economy was over Ksh 100 billion (close to $1.5 billion) 
by early February 2008 and mounting. For one week in 
early January, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, South Sudan 
and eastern Congo were short of fuel and other essential 
commodities because the Mombasa highway, their main 
supply route, was paralysed.  
The international community reacted swiftly to contain 
the crisis and put pressure on Kenyan leaders to end the 
violence. After initially endorsing the election results, 
Washington backtracked, questioned their credibility and 
sent Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi 
Frazer to support a negotiated solution. UK Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown called on the rival contenders to exercise 
restraint and supported the good offices of the AU chair, 
Ghanaian President John Kufuor. UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon quickly condemned the violence and 
subsequently visited Nairobi. A first round of discreet 
shuttle diplomacy produced an agreement of principles 
on a review of the election results and the negotiation of 
a transition towards a settlement of the crisis. However, 
hardliners in the Kibaki camp convinced the president to 
disown the document.  
Both coalitions, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
and the Party of National Unity (PNU), include leaders 
from the largest communities of the country but are 
supported by ethnically-rooted political constituencies 
that include fanatical followers. For PNU they are the 
Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru, who originate from the Central 
and Eastern Provinces and are strongly represented in 
the Nairobi Area, Coast Province and the Rift Valley as 
a result of migration. ODM’s ethnic constituencies are 
Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin, who originate from Nyanza 
and Western Provinces and the Rift Valley and are 
equally strongly represented in the major towns. ODM 
also has a significant following among the coastal Muslims 
and in North Eastern Province. 
In the slums of Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret and Mombasa, 
protests and confrontations with the police rapidly turned 
into revenge killings targeting representatives of the 
political opponent’s ethnic base. Kikuyu, Embu and Meru 
were violently evicted from Luo and Luhya dominated 
areas, while Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin were chased from 
Kikuyu-dominated settlements or sought refuge at police 
stations. Simultaneously, Kikuyu settlements, the largest 
migrant communities in the Rift Valley, were the primary 
victims of Kalenjin vigilante attacks that were reminiscent 
of the state-supported ethnic clashes of the mid-1990s. 
This violence has shattered Kenya’s reputation for stability. 
The grisly images of a church compound with as many 
as 30 people inside torched by vigilantes in southern 
Eldoret, buildings burnt in Kisumu city centre and Nairobi 
slums on fire illustrated the fragility of a national fabric 
in which the disparity between rich and poor remains one 
of the world’s biggest. Kenya needs more than a political 
settlement to restore its people’s trust in their government 
and rebuild the foundations of a stable democracy. The 
violence that erupted in Nairobi and Mombasa slums 
and in the Rift Valley illustrated the depth of the wounds 
Daniel arap Moi’s divide-and-rule policies inflicted during 
the 1990s and the urgent need to address redistribution of 
land and other sources of wealth. There can be no return 
to business as usual and the laissez-faire attitude Kibaki 
favoured. A legitimately elected government should 
remain the goal, but fundamental institutional and economic 
reforms are needed, as well as an internationally monitored 
transitional justice and militia dismantlement process, to 
prevent resumption of ethnic violence and heal its wounds. 
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II. THE ELECTION CRISIS 
The rigging of the presidential election started to be 
denounced by the opposition on 29 December 2007, the 
day before release of final results. Irregularities identified 
by ODM were later confirmed by both national and 
international observers and senior ECK officials. The 
rigging appears to have been twofold. Following a tight 
contest, both ODM and PNU sought support from 
commissioners and returning officers from their respective 
strongholds to inflate their totals. A second plan was set 
up at central ECK level to ensure the incumbent, Mwai 
Kibaki, would remain in office regardless of the electorate’s 
decision.  
As the count progressed, some results were withheld and 
modified. Kibaki’s tally was inflated in the computer room 
at the Kenyatta International Conference Centre in order 
to give him a narrow lead over his main opponent, Raila 
Odinga. Officially, the results became 4,584,721 for Kibaki, 
4,352,993 for Odinga, with Kalonzo Musyoka a distant 
third at 879,903.  
A. A TIGHT AND TENSE RACE 
The 2007 presidential election was without doubt the 
closest since the restoration of a multiparty system in 
December 1991.1 In 1992 and 1997, the divisions within 
the opposition and multiple candidacies cost the leaders 
of the democratisation process their chance for victory. 
In 1992, Oginga Odinga, Raila Odinga’s father and historic 
leader of the independence movement, Kenneth Matiba 
and Mwai Kibaki, both from Central Province, were 
unable to agree on a single champion. Five years later, 
Kibaki, Raila Odinga and Charity Ngilu from Ukambani 
made the same mistake. 
The opposition defeated the Kenya African National Union 
(KANU) party and Moi’s chosen successor, Uhuru 
Kenyatta, a son of Jomo Kenyatta, the nation’s first leader, 
only after it agreed on a common platform in 2002.2 It 
 
 
1 Moi’s re-elections in 1992 and 1997 occurred in a violent 
environment and with an electoral commission biased in his 
favour. On the 1992 general elections, see David Throup and 
Charles Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics in Kenya. The Kenyatta 
and Moi States and the Triumph of the system in the 1992 
elections (Oxford, 1998). On the 1997 elections, see Marcel 
Rutten, Alamin Mazrui and François Grignon (eds.), Out for 
the Count! The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for 
Democracy in Kenya (Kampala, 2001). Moi received only 33 
per cent of the vote in 1992, 37 per cent in 1997. 
2 See David Anderson, “Briefing: Kenya’s elections 2002 — 
the dawning of a new era?”, African Affairs, no. 102 (2003), 
pp. 331-342. 
brought Kibaki to power as the head of the National 
Rainbow Coalition (NARC) by stipulating a post-
electoral power-sharing deal and constitutional reform 
agenda in a signed memorandum of understanding (MoU).3 
The 2007 political line-up resulted from the NARC’s 
collapse soon after its victory. After his election, Kibaki 
refused to implement the MoU, share power posts equally 
between its signatories and carry out the constitutional 
reforms necessary to create the position of prime minister 
for Odinga.4  
This broke the NARC into its two main components – 
Odinga’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Kibaki’s 
National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) – and led to the creation 
of the ODM, which brought together all parties which 
campaigned for a “No” vote at the referendum organised to 
endorse a government-sponsored draft constitution in 2005.5 
That draft, originally produced by the Bomas constitutional 
conference, was considerably amended by the NAK-
dominated parliament and thus fell far short of promised 
institutional reforms, such as reduction of presidential 
powers, an executive prime minister, reinforcement of 
parliamentary control over government and supervision 
of judicial independence and decentralisation of central 
government responsibilities. Kibaki and the remnants of 
his coalition led the “Yes” campaign, which suffered a 
significant defeat in the referendum – 58.3 per cent to 
41.7 per cent – which was viewed as a vote of no-
confidence in his government. 
Its victory in the referendum made the ODM confident 
of an easy victory in 2007, but Musyoka broke ranks with 
Odinga and launched his own presidential bid under an 
“ODM-Kenya” ticket. Uhuru Kenyatta, under pressure 
from the old Moi establishment and his own Kikuyu 




3 See Mugambi Ngaru, “Alliances and Agreements of 
Tolerance as a Pre-Condition for Coalition Governments: 
Experience from Kenya”, paper presented at the Regional 
Conference on Political Parties and Democratisation in East 
Africa, Arusha, 25-27 August 2005. 
4 Joel D. Barkan, “Kenya After Moi”, Foreign Affairs, January/ 
February 2004.  
5 The ECK assigned an orange as a symbol for the “No” 
campaign coalition, including the LDP and KANU, and a 
banana as a symbol for the “Yes” campaign, supported by the 
NAK, NARC and affiliated parties, Wanyama Masinde, 
“Kenya’s fruitless referendum”, openDemocracy, 21 
November 2005.  
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1. Coalition building 
The campaign was marred by several violent incidents 
and repeated abuse of office by government officials6 but 
not to the extent experienced in 1992 or 1997, when KANU 
barred opposition politicians from parts of the country and 
violently targeted members of the communities considered 
to be their natural supporters (Kikuyu, Luo).7 The worst 
violence in 2007 was in the heavily contested Western 
Province and in the areas of Molo, Kuresoi and Mt Elgon 
in the Rift Valley.8 Longstanding land conflicts between 
neighbouring communities escalated as their leaders 
positioned themselves within PNU or ODM, and youths 
were mobilised to intimidate voters. 
Kenya’s presidential races have usually been won through 
coalition building and appeals to the swing voters in 
Western, Coast, Eastern (Ukambani) and North Eastern 
Provinces, who rarely vote as a bloc.9 Voters from Central 
and Nyanza Provinces and the North Rift Valley do vote 
as a bloc for a candidate from their community (Kikuyu, 
Luo, Kalenjin) and/or representing their interests. The 
Luhya (Western Province), Kamba (Eastern Province), 
Mijikenda (Coast Province), Kisii (Nyanza Province) and 
Taita (Coast Province) electorates are much less predictable 
than the Kikuyus, Luos and Kalenjin, who tend to be 
motivated by belief in a God-given right to rule the country 
and largely share a deeply rooted ethnic nationalism.10 
 
 
6 “Still Behaving Badly: Second periodic report of the Election- 
Monitoring Project”, Kenya National Commission on Human 
Rights (KNCHR), December 2007. 
7 On the ethnic clashes of the 1990s, see among other references 
“Divide and Rule: State-sponsored ethnic violence in Kenya”, 
Human Rights Watch/Africa Watch, 1993; and “Kayas of 
Deprivation, Kayas of Blood: Violence, ethnicity and the state 
in coastal Kenya”, Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), 
Nairobi, 1997. The International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH) and KHRC reported in April 2007 that 380,000 
Kenyans were still IDPs because of the politically instigated 
ethnic clashes of the 1990s, “Massive internal displacements 
in Kenya due to politically instigated ethnic clashes”, FIDH/ 
KHRC, no. 471/2, April 2007.  
8 300 people died and 60,000 have fled their homes since early 
2006 in land clashes of the Mt Elgon Area. Up to 10,000 from 
Kuresoi were displaced to Molo in pre-electoral clashes, and 
several campaign incidents occurred in Western and Nyanza 
Provinces, with 70 deaths. “EU condemns pre-election violence 
in Kenya”, Reuters, 21 December 2007; “Kenya pre-election 
violence soars”, Al Jazeera, 7 December 2007; “Mobs kill 
three Kenyan policemen in electoral violence”, Agence France- 
Presse, 26 December 2007; and “Still Behaving Badly”, op. cit.  
9 Throup and Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics in Kenya, op. cit. 
10 This does not mean that intense political debate on leadership 
and parameters of political accountability does not occur within 
communities in vernacular languages, but competition for the 
centre of power between leaders of different communities 
usually relegates the issues raised in these debates to the 
The Luhya electorate of Western Province is one of the 
most populous (two million voters) and sought after by 
presidential candidates from other communities. Each 
presidential candidate chose a Luhya running mate: 
incumbent Vice-President Moody Awori (PNU); former 
Vice-President Musalia Mudavadi (ODM); and Dr Julia 
Ojiambo (ODM-K). The Kamba electorate was expected 
to rally behind the Kamba presidential aspirant, Kalonzo 
Musyoka, so Muslim voters from Coast and North Eastern 
Provinces became the second most sought after swing voter 
reserve.  
The Muslim establishment appeared split, but the Muslim 
poor seemed to favour Raila Odinga, notably after the 
signature of an MoU between ODM and Muslim leaders, 
facilitated by Coast leader Najib Balala. Muslims also 
supported ODM in protest against the perceived close 
relations with U.S. anti-terrorism policy which led to the 
deportation of several Kenyans to Ethiopia and Somalia 
in October 2007 and the stripping of their nationality. 
Although the government subsequently took steps to 
assuage Muslim unease over the so-called rendition saga, 
the damage was done: Kibaki was largely viewed by the 
community as untrustworthy.11  
Despite its repeated splits, ODM presented a relatively 
large coalition at the poll, led by Odinga (Luo, Nyanza 
Province) and a group of five, referred to as the “pentagon”: 
William Ruto (Nandi/Kalenjin,12 Rift Valley), Najib 
Balala (Swahili, Coast Province), Charity Ngilu (Kamba, 
Eastern Province), Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya, Western 
Province) and Joseph Nyagah (Embu, Eastern Province). 
Henry Kosgei (Nandi/Kalenjin, Rift Valley) was appointed 
chairperson and Peter Anyang’Nyong’o (Luo, Nyanza 
Province) secretary general. Although ODM included 
leaders from all over the country and fielded candidates 
in all provinces, its main support came from the west 
(Nyanza Province, Western Province, Western Rift 
Valley), Muslims from the Coast and North Eastern 
Province and a large majority of the youth in major towns 
(Mombasa, Nairobi, Eldoret, Kisumu, Kakamega). 
 
 
margins, John Lonsdale, “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: 
Wealth, Poverty and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu political thought”, 
in Lonsdale and Bruce Berman (eds.), Unhappy Valley. 
Conflict in Kenya and Africa. Book Two: Violence and 
Ethnicity (Oxford, 1992), pp. 315-468; and François Grignon, 
“Le democratisation au risque du débat: territoires de la critique 
et imaginaires politiques au Kenya (1990-1995)”, in Denis-
Constant Martin (ed.), Nouveaux langages du politique en 
Afrique orientale (Paris, 1998), pp. 29-114.  
11 National Muslim Leaders Forum (NAMLEF), news release, 
October 2007. 
12 “Kalenjin” does not refer to a community but to a family of 
nilo-cushite communities from the Rift Valley speaking 
related dialects. They include notably the Nandi, Kipsigis, 
Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet and Sabaot tribes. 
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The PNU and its affiliated parties were dominated by 
close associates of President Kibaki from the Central and 
Eastern Provinces. These included former Minister of 
State for Defence Njenga Karume (Kikuyu, Central 
Province), former Minister for Internal Security John 
Michuki (Kikuyu, Central Province), Minister for 
Constitutional Affairs Martha Karua (Kikuyu, Central 
Province), former Minister for Energy Kiraitu Murungi 
(Meru, Eastern Province) and former Minister for Finance 
David Mwiraria (Meru, Eastern Province).  
The coalition also reached out to swing voters in Western, 
North Eastern, Nyanza (Kisii), Rift Valley and Coast 
Province through Vice-President Moody Awori (Luhya, 
Western Province), Minister for Transport Chirau Ali 
Mwakwere (Mijikenda, Coast Province), former Vice-
President Georges Saitoti (Kikuyu, Rift Valley), former 
Minister for Roads and Public Works Simeon Nyachae 
(Kisii, Nyanza Province) and chief campaign leader 
George Nyamweya (Kisii, Nyanza Province). Former 
President Moi and barons of the previous regime such as 
Nicholas Biwott were brought in to galvanise Kalenjin 
support; leaders of other associated parties (Musikaru 
Kombo/Ford-Kenya, Luhya/Western), Uhuru Kenyatta 
(KANU, Kikuyu/Central) were likewise included.13 
Ten weeks before the polls, the ODM wave appeared 
unbeatable. Odinga held a 16 per cent lead in opinion 
polls, and the youth vote, one of the most important new 
factors, was expected to guarantee his victory.14 Thanks 
to a youth mobilisation campaign – Vijana Tugutuke Ni 
Time Yetu (“Let’s wake up youth, it’s our time”) – 
conducted by a non-governmental organisation (NGO), 
the Institute for Education in Democracy, two entertainment 
companies and the ECK from March 2006 to May 2007, 
 
 
13 Judy Kibaki, the incumbent president’s daughter, became 
financial controller and a principal fundraiser of his campaign, 
with businessman Peter Kanyago, “The rising star of the 
Kibaki clan”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, 2 June 2007. Other 
family members were directly involved in the campaign (wife 
Lucy, sons Jimmy and David Kagai), together with the 
Kikuyu political/business establishment, which forms the 
close guard behind the president, including Lee Karuri 
(architect), George Muhoho (Kenya Ports Authority), Joe 
Wanjui (chancellor, University of Nairobi), former Minister 
for Defence Njenga Karume (Kiambaa MP), John Michuki 
(then internal security minister), Nathaniel Kang’ethe (director 
of Kenya Revenue Authority and owner of MCL Saatchi and 
Saatchi franchise), Eddy Njoroge (Kengen), Julius Gecau 
(formerly Kenya Power and Lighting Company) and Duncan 
Ndegwa (formerly Central Bank governor when Kibaki was 
finance minister), “Kibaki mobilises his whole family”, Indian 
Ocean Newsletter, 20 October 2007; and “Kibaki’s preliminary 
campaign”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, 28 July 2007. 
14 “Raila widens gap”, The East African Standard, 13 October 
2007; and “Raila is the Youth’s favourite candidate”, The 
Nation, 8 October 2007.  
1.6 million new voters were added to the registry and 
2.1 million transferred to their actual area of residence, 
thus changing the political landscape significantly.15 The 
urban youth electorate became the third biggest sought 
after constituency.  
Musyoka’s ODM-Kenya attempted to reach beyond its 
natural Kamba base to other communities in the Rift Valley 
and Western Province through the candidate’s running 
mate, Julia Ojiambo (Luhya, Western Province) and 
party chairperson Samuel Pogishio (Pokot, Rift Valley). 
However, it failed to build a nationwide coalition. Instead, 
Musyoka appeared to rely on a well-articulated, issue-
oriented campaign on family values, religious inspiration 
and an anti-corruption agenda.16  
2. The issues 
ODM portrayed itself as the coalition to bring an Orange 
revolution and democratic change to Kenya, defending 
the poor and the weak against a government controlled 
by a clique of business people from the Muthaiga Golf 
Club and alleged corrupt politicians who had betrayed 
the 2002 reform agenda, publicly stigmatised as the “Mt 
Kenya mafia”.17 A new constitutional order, devolution 
and equitable distribution of resources were presented as 
its agenda. PNU campaigned with the motto Kazi idendelee 
(“Work continues”) and emphasised economic recovery 
– the steady 5-6 per cent growth rate during the second 
half of Kibaki’s presidency, which has allowed Kenya to 
become financially self-reliant and to fund free primary 
education and the creation of constituency development 
funds (CDFs). Free secondary education was one of 
Kibaki main re-election promises.18 
Several factors probably contributed to the erosion of 
Odinga’s lead in the polls. PNU aggressively attacked 
ODM on its majimbo agenda. That term – meaning 
“devolution” in Swahili – is negatively associated in the 
collective memory with the support for federalism and 
 
 
15 According to the ECK, there was an increase of 57 per cent 
in those under 35 in the voter register, which Chair Samuel 
Kivuitu attributed to the Vijana Tugutuke campaign. Written 
communication to Crisis Group, Institute for Education in 
Democracy, January 2008. 
16 Musyoka, who had some wealthy supporters, declared his 
personal assets and challenged his opponents to do the same, 
“The networks of Kibaki’s challengers”, Indian Ocean 
Newsletter, 19 May 2005. 
17 “Kenya: spreading the word of hate”, IRIN, 23 January 2008. 
18 “Pledge No. 1 Every child including those with special 
needs, will be educated for free in public schools from primary 
to secondary education, giving every single child no matter 
their background an equal opportunity in life through 
education.”, PNU Party Manifesto, at www.kenyavotes.org 
/node/93. 
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against the unitary state expressed by minority communities 
at independence. It is generally perceived to be a project 
to benefit the biggest communities (Luo, Kikuyu), driven 
by the ambition of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu 
and Coastal populations in particular to gain exclusive 
control over their respective provinces’ natural and other 
economic resources and expel migrant communities from 
those areas in order to reclaim their land, jobs and property. 
The ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley and Coast Province 
of the 1990s were partly organised in the name of majimbo.  
PNU thus accused ODM of fomenting ethnic cleansing 
of migrant communities under the guise of majimbo. The 
Orange movement tried to dissociate itself from the violent 
and ethnic chauvinist stigma attached to the majimbo 
debate but also knew the confusion would rally maximum 
support among the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu 
(commonly known as KAMATUSA) communities of the 
Rift Valley, as well as coastal populations. Several of its 
leaders – Ruto, Kosgei and Balala – come from the Rift 
Valley and Coast Province, and particularly its Kalenjin 
and Maasai leaders (Kipkalia Kones, Franklin Bett, Zakayo 
Cheruiyot and William ole Ntimama) are reputed to have 
participated in the ethnic clashes of the 1990s.19  
A related campaign was launched by PNU against the MoU 
signed by ODM and the Muslim leadership, alleging a 
secret deal to establish Sharia (Islamic) law in the Muslim-
dominated provinces.20 PNU relied heavily on the Catholic 
and Anglican churches to mobilise support. Bishops and 
other senior church leaders, uneasy at ODM’s alliance with 
the Muslim communities and some of the country’s biggest 
Pentecostal churches, as well as majimbo, were co-opted 
by the government’s camp.21 A Luo presidency was 
described as a recipe for economic disaster endangering 
the growth of the Kibaki presidency. The finance minister, 
Amos Kimunya, predicted a collapse of the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE) if Odinga won and brought back the 
 
 
19 “Divide and Rule”, op. cit.; and “Report of the judicial 
commission appointed to inquire into tribal clashes in Kenya”, 
Nairobi, 2001. 
20 A fake MoU detailing the Islamic rule to be established in 
the Coast and North Eastern Provinces circulated on the 
internet. North eastern and coastal populations were particularly 
angry with the Kibaki administration for what was considered 
a blank cheque given to the U.S. to operate on Kenyan soil for 
its anti-terrorism operations and the expulsion without due 
process to Ethiopia of “suspected terrorists”, “Revealed: Raila’s 
real MoU with Muslims”, The Nation, 28 November 2007. 
21 Cardinal Njue sided with Kibaki in the majimbo debate and 
condemned ODM’s support. Kisumu’s Bishop Okoth 
immediately contradicted him, emphasising that this was not 
the Bishop’s Conference position but Njue’s own. “Kenya: 
Catholic Bishop Differs With Njue On Majimbo”, The Nation, 
30 October 2007. 
mismanagement of the Moi years,22 propaganda that 
appealed to the urban middle and lower-middle classes, 
which had benefited from economic liberalisation under 
Kibaki.23 
Also contributing to the reduction of Odinga’s lead were 
personal attacks against the ODM leadership, based on 
deeply rooted ethnic prejudice that cut across society. 
PNU leaders asserted publicly that an “uncircumcised 
boy” could not lead the country.24 This charge appealed 
especially to members of the Bantu communities, for 
whom circumcision is a key social value, associated with 
cleanliness and respectability. It was also intended to win 
votes from Kikuyu in the Nairobi slums, the poorest of the 
poor in Central Province, and the migrant communities in 
the Rift Valley.25 Kikuyu vernacular radios simultaneously 
spread fear that the community would be in danger from a 
Luo President.26 More than anything else, Kibaki needed to 
stimulate maximum support from the GEMA communities, 
whose low turnout would definitely defeat him.27 
The electorate gave both coalitions a taste of its desire for 
change during the November 2007 primaries to choose 
their parliamentary and local government candidates, which 
were marred by violence,28 corruption29 and confusion.30 
 
 
22 Amos Kimunya blamed a downturn in the stock market on 
ODM’s lead in the polls in mid-October, claiming that an ODM 
government would reverse privatisation. “Kenya: Mudavadi 
Refutes Kimunya's NSE Confidence Claims”, The Standard, 
15 October 2007. 
23 One of the Kenyan ethnic prejudices refers to the Kikuyu as 
the only business minded community of the country. 
24 Luo men are traditionally not circumcised; males in most 
other Kenyan communities are to mark entry into adulthood. 
25 The Kikuyu ethno-nationalist Mungiki sect also mobilised 
behind Kibaki, under the banner of the Kenya National Youth 
Alliance, “A Sect is readying for 2007”, Indian Ocean 
Newsletter, 18 June 2007. Its leaders, Ndura Waruinge and 
Maina Njenga, supported the “Yes” vote in 2005, “The 
Mungiki will vote Yes”, Indian Ocean Newsletter, 19 
November 2005. 
26 “Kenya: spreading the word of hate”, op. cit. 
27 GEMA stands for Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association, a 
community-based organisation involving leaders of the 
populations living around Mt Kenya. It was created in the 1970s 
to support the settlement of Kikuyu families in the Rift Valley. 
28 “Kenya: Confusion and Violence Mar Party Nominations”, 
The Nation, 17 November 2007. 
29 According to the Coalition for Accountable Political Party 
Financing (CAPF), more than Ksh 900 million ($14.5 million) 
was spent to bribe voters during party nominations. “Of the 
Ksh 900 million spent in the two weeks preceding the party 
primaries, only Ksh 300 million actually reached the voters. 
The remaining Ksh was allegedly shared among campaign 
agents and middlemen”, “Hawking democracy to the highest 
bidder is a disgrace”, The Standard, 27 November 2007. 
30 Within both PNU and ODM, some leaders obtained direct 
nominations, which angered many supporters and forced ODM 
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In total, one cabinet minister, four assistant ministers and 
37 parliamentarians were defeated, including the former 
internal security minister, Chris Murungaru; the assistant 
gender and social services minister, Alicen Chelaite; Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate Wangari Maathai; and former KANU 
stalwarts Joseph Kamotho and G.G. Kariuki. Had PNU 
not given direct nominations to 46 candidates – a majority 
of ministers – the number of cabinet casualties would 
probably have been much higher.31 ODM lost ten incumbent 
parliamentarians from Nyanza Province, six from Western 
Province and five in the Rift Valley.32  
In the end 2,600 candidates, more than twice the 2002 
number, stood for the 210 parliamentary seats. ODM 
offered the most (190), PNU 135 and its affiliated parties, 
KANU, DP and NARC, 91, 86 and 59, respectively.33 
All together, 108 parties sponsored candidates for 
parliament, including 269 women.  
As the campaign ended, the Steadman polling institute still 
gave Odinga a 2 percentage point lead in the presidential 
race.34 Despite a tense environment, allegations of fraud 
and the appointment of five new ECK commissioners two 
months earlier in violation of a 1997 inter-party agreement 
requiring advance consultation,35 the country generally 
believed that Chair Samuel Kivuitu’s leadership was a 
guarantee for the independence and good performance 
of the electoral commission. Kivuitu had successfully 
presided over the election which ended KANU’s 32-year 
reign. The potential end of Kibaki’s five-year presidency 
did not appear to be such a problem. 
 
 
to apologise, “Chaos over direct nominations”, The Nation, 16 
November 2007. Many primary losers changed parties, often 
buying their nomination from the leaderships of small parties, 
“Chaos as ODM Cancels Results”, The Nation, 20 November 
2007; and “Losers in Primaries Work Overdrive to Ensure 
Smooth Sail in New Parties”, The Nation, 19 November 2007. 
31 “46 get direct PNU tickets”, The Nation, 16 November 
2007. Many who received direct nominations were defeated in 
the general election. 
32 “Voters Kick out Big Guns”, The Nation, 18 November 2007. 
33 The second largest number of candidates was from 
KENDA, the party of controversial millionaire turned 
preacher Kamlesh Pattni, “2,600 Candidates in Battle for 
MP’s Seats”, The Nation, 28 November 2007. 
34 “Steadman releases its last polls before election”, The East 
African Standard, 19 December 2007. 
35 Nine new commissioners had already been appointed 
without consultation with parliamentary political parties on 11 
January 2007. On the reforms supported by the 1997 inter-
party parliamentary group agreement (IPPG), see Stephen N. 
Ndegwa, “The incomplete transition: the constitutional and 
electoral context in Kenya”, Africa Today, vol. 45, no. 2 
(April-June 1998), pp. 193-204. 
Number of Registered Voters and Official 2007  
Presidential Election Results.  





























































B. THE RIGGING OF THE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION 
All national and international observers, including the 
Kenya Democratic Elections Forum (KEDOF), the 
European Union (EU), the Commonwealth secretariat, 
the East African community and the International 
Republican Institute (IRI), reported that while the voting 
and counting of ballots at polling-station level was orderly 
and satisfactory with a few exceptions, the tallying and 
compiling of the results was manipulated, dramatically 
undermining the credibility of the results Kivuitu 
announced on 30 December.36 The best and most detailed 
illustration of the rigging was provided in the detailed 
testimony of four national observers who participated 
 
 
36 “Preliminary statement and verdict of the 2007 Kenya 
general elections”, Kenya Elections Domestic Observation 
Forum (KEDOF), 31 December 2007; “Preliminary statement: 
Doubts about the credibility of the presidential results hamper 
Kenya’s democratic progress”, European Union Elections 
Observation Mission (EUEOM), 1 January 2008; “Kenya 
General Election 27 December 2007: The Report of the 
Commonwealth Observer Group”, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
January 2008; “Report on the Kenya general elections December 
2007”, East African Community Observer Mission, January 
2008; and “Statement on Post-Election Violence in Kenya”, 
International Republican Institute, 2 January 2008. 
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during the night of 29 to 30 December, with ODM, ODM-
K and PNU party agents and five ECK commissioners, 
in a review of the contested results at the Kenyatta 
International Conference Centre (KICC) tallying 
headquarters in Nairobi.37  
The delays in the announcement of presidential results 
were the first indicators of trouble. The presidential ballots 
are traditionally counted and tallied first in polling stations. 
Their late announcement, after parliamentary results, 
raised suspicions. The ECK chair said on 29 December 
he had lost contact with some of his returning officers, 
who had switched off their phones, and he could not 
explain the delays, particularly in returns from nearby 
constituencies in Nairobi and Central Province. He added 
on live television that he hoped “the books were not being 
cooked”.38 Under pressure from ODM agents who pointed 
out that some results being announced by the ECK’s 
tallying centre at KICC differed from those announced 
at constituency level, Kivuitu agreed to an audit of the 
results already announced, with two party agents for each 
of the two main candidates and five national observers.39  
During the audit, party agents agreed that the results of 
44 constituencies already announced were untrustworthy, 
as they were not supported by proper legal documentation. 
Nineteen additional results were yet to be announced. 
The original statutory forms, 16 and 16A, which are used 
to record the results officially and should have been 
turned in signed by returning officers and counter-signed 
by party agents, were often missing. Other irregularities 
were illustrated by inconsistencies between presidential 
and parliamentary tallies and instances of more votes 
than registered voters.40 The ECK file for parliamentary 
results from Maragwa in Central Province, for instance, 
was presented to the ECK chair with form 17 indicating 
115 per cent turnout for the parliamentary elections. ECK 
officials later decided to manually change these results 
and make them credible by reducing this to an 85.27 per 
cent turnout.41 The following testimony was reported by 
the national observers:  
One ECK senior staff member called observer Koki 
Muli outside the hall and asked her if she was aware 
that something terrible was happening. The senior 
staff pointed out that it is important for observers 
 
 
37 “Countdown to deception: 30 hours that destroyed Kenya”, 
Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) coalition, 17 
January 2008. 
38 Crisis Group witnessed the statement. 
39 “Countdown to deception”, op. cit. 
40 Ibid. 
41 The ECK later stated that the results were exaggerated in 
only one polling station. This does not sound credible, 
however, since no single polling station had more than 1,000 
voters on its register.  
to scrutinise all ROs’ [returning officers’] returns 
especially of Mombasa, Central, Eastern, North 
Eastern, Rift Valley and Nyanza. The senior staff 
also cautioned that the discrepancies were planned 
systematically and were not accidental, and they 
involved most Commissioners who clearly 
organised how the tallying was to be carried out. 
There was also the concern that Commissioners 
were in charge of their regions and most of the 
Commissioners engaged Returning Officers who 
owed them some loyalty and in some cases replaced 
Returning Officers who had experience, having 
worked with ECK in the past.42 
This statement is consistent with information provided 
by the ECK Chair Kivuitu to Crisis Group. From April 
to November 2007, he had been obliged to delegate 
management of the commission to other commissioners 
due to serious health problems. The lists of returning 
and presiding officers to run the elections was changed 
by a “steering committee” established in his absence. 
Contrary to established practice, commissioners chose to 
supervise the elections in their own province and also 
hand-picked the returning officers. In Central Province, 
in particular, Kikuyu returning officers were appointed 
contrary to an internal directive recommending that no 
returning officer should come from the community for 
which he or she had responsibility.43  
The ECK chair also claimed he was not informed by his 
commissioners that presidential results of 44 constituencies 
had been identified as contentious. The minutes of the 
audit given him by his colleagues and prepared by the 
ECK senior legal officer showed that the disputes had 
been resolved during the night. He also claimed he had 
not been informed that a meeting was planned on 30 
December with the participants of the audit to agree on 
the course of action. On 30 December, the planned 
follow-up meeting never took place, and national observers 
who had participated in the audit were barred from the 
commissioners’ office.44 Misinformed and unable to 
independently verify the claims presented by ODM, Kivuitu 
announced the results of the contested constituencies on 
the morning of 30 December, as provided by the law.  
He thus accepted results which appeared to have been 
tampered with or were not supported by adequate 
documentation.45 Kipkemoi arap Kirui, an ECK contractor 
 
 
42 “Countdown to deception”, op. cit., p. 7. 
43 Crisis Group interview, ECK chair, Nairobi, February 2008. 
44 Crisis Group has seen copies of the minutes, which indeed 
allege that all problems had been solved during the night. 
45 For the recorded irregularities by constituency and the attitude 
of the ECK during that night, see the detailed log of events 
recorded by national observers in “Countdown to deception”, 
op. cit. 
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participating in one of the tallying teams at the ECK 
national centre at KICC, came out to the media with ODM 
senior leaders soon after the announcement and explained 
that in his team the results were illegally tallied, unverified, 
and unsupported by required statutory documentation 
(forms 16 and 16A). Although the forms were missing or 
had not been signed or stamped by returning officers or 
confirmed by party agents, the results were transmitted to 
the computer room for compilation by his team leader.46  
Rigging thus appears to have taken place at two stages of 
the tallying process: one at constituency level and one at 
central ECK level. The first fraud was throughout the 
country, with the assignment by ECK commissioners of 
returning officers to their provincial strongholds, where 
some of the chosen returning officers tampered with the 
vote count and sent to Nairobi inflated returns for their 
preferred candidate. The discrepancies between results 
and turnouts of the parliamentary and presidential elections, 
the reported expulsion of party agents from tallying rooms 
and the very high turnouts (over 95 per cent) recorded in 
some constituencies are the signs of this in both ODM 
and PNU strongholds. 
The second fraud was organised in Nairobi, within the 
ECK premises, where the results were changed to give 
Kibaki a 230,000-vote victory. The disappearance of 
returning officers in PNU strongholds in particular, and 
the lack of either stamps or proper signatures of party 
agents on the statutory forms presented in the last two 
days of the count are damning indications. From 29 
December onwards, senior ECK officials heading tallying 
teams and running the computer room changed results 
coming from the constituency tallying centres or endorsed 
results which had already been changed, and instructed 
staff to accept and compile them without supporting 
documentation.47 They succeeded in having ECK 
commissioners and the chair announce questionable 
results which reversed Odinga’s lead and gave the victory 
to Kibaki. 
As reported by national monitors, it is now essentially 
impossible to determine an accurate tally. Rigging occurred 
both at constituency and central level; only a recount of 
every ballot – provided all the ballots themselves have 
not been destroyed or tampered with – might be able to 
tell the exact results. However, enormous doubt is cast 
over Kibaki’s victory by the discrepancy of 325,131 votes 
between presidential and parliamentary returns48 and by 
the fact that results announced by the ECK at the Kenyatta 
Centre did not match with those released at the constituency 
 
 
46 Crisis Group interview, Kipkemoi arap Kirui, Nairobi, January 
2008. Under threat, Kirui has been forced to flee the country. 
47 Crisis Group has seen copies of ECK statutory forms 
manually corrected to increase Kibaki’s returns. 
48 There was a discrepancy of 50,192 votes in 2002. 
tallying centres as reported by the national media and/or 
observed by the KEDOF and EU observers. 
The day after the announcement, ECK officials conceded 
that much. Four commissioners issued a press statement 
on 31 December recognising that “some of the information 
received from some of our returning officers now cast 
doubts on the veracity of the figures”.49 The chair added 
on 1 January: “Concerns about these situations [turnout 
discrepancies and alleged irregularities] cannot be 
dismissed off hand. They call for investigation”.50 ECK 
officials, however, maintained that on 29-30 December, 
despite the reported problems, they had no other choice 
than to announce the results as required by law, and the 
dispute would have to be settled by a court. Alternatively, 
the chair added, “if the parties in the dispute so agree, an 
independent impartial team of eminent men and women 
can be empowered to study and inquire into the whole 
matter. It should have the power to make a finding as to 
the effect of any anomalies it may find. Their decision 
should be binding on the disputing parties”.51  
Kenya thus found itself in a dangerous political crisis. As 
Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in at State House and flown 
to a coastal military facility,52 the internal security minister 
suspended all live media broadcasts. ODM immediately 
rejected the results announced by the ECK chair and 
refused to recognise Kibaki as president. It also dismissed 
election petition judicial procedures as having no credibility, 
since the judiciary was under the control of the incumbent 
president. Parliamentary results confirmed the opposition’s 
conviction that the presidential election had been rigged. 
PNU won only 43 seats – slightly over 20 per cent of the 
total – with eighteen being in Central Province and 25 in 
the rest of the country. ODM won 99 seats, seven short 
of an absolute majority. 23 cabinet ministers lost their seats, 
often to complete newcomers. In addition, the official 
ECK results named Odinga the winner in six of the eight 
provinces. Violent protests started almost immediately 
in most major towns. 
 
 
49 “Press statement” by Ambassador Jack Tumwa, D.A. 
Ndambiri, S.K. arap Ngeny and J. Matagaro, 31 December 2007. 
50 “Press statement by S.M. Kivuitu, Chairman, Electoral 
Commission of Kenya, Parliamentary election results”, 1 
January 2008. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Crisis Group interview, Mombasa, January 2008. 
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III. THE SECURITY CRISIS 
The violence in Kisumu and other towns of western Kenya 
started on 29 December, as a protest against delays in 
the announcement of results. The next day, immediately 
after the ECK announcement, riots broke out across the 
country, mainly in Nairobi, Kisumu, Eldoret (the scene 
of the terrible church massacre which did more to focus 
and sustain international attention on the erupting crisis 
than anything else) and Mombasa. Odinga supporters 
turned their anger on those they perceived as supporters 
of Kibaki, mainly members of the Kikuyu tribe. The 
ferocity and speed of the violence caught many by surprise. 
Hundreds were killed in less than 24 hours. Houses and 
shops were set ablaze. Thousands began fleeing. By the 
second day, Kenya appeared to be on the brink of civil 
war.  
A. PROTEST AND REPRESSION 
Much of the initial violence was sparked off by the outrage 
felt by ODM partisans, who saw victory literally snatched 
from their leader on live television. This outrage quickly 
became ethnically oriented, with Luo mobs venting their 
anger on poor and hapless Kikuyu neighbours. Kikuyu 
youths promptly assembled to take revenge against any 
non-Kikuyu in their residential areas. The Kibera slum in 
Nairobi, predominantly an ODM stronghold in Odinga’s 
own constituency, was the epicentre of much of the 
violence that rocked the capital. Gangs of youths armed 
with machetes, clubs and other crude weapons set upon 
their neighbours. Shops, makeshift kiosks, houses and 
garages were set on fire. Close to 50 people were killed 
that night, according to estimates by the Kenya Red Cross 
and other aid agencies, mainly by machete and gunshot. 
There are reports that dozens of women and girls were 
raped.53  
Other slum districts of Nairobi with a mix of Luo and 
Kikuyu residents, such as Mathare, Korogocho, Huruma, 
Kariobangi and Dandora, were also rocked by the violence. 
Dozens were killed, and police had to be deployed in 
large numbers to separate the warring groups. The officially 
outlawed Kikuyu Mungiki sect swung into action only 
hours after the presidential vote was announced, beheading 
and mutilating Luo and Luhya residents in the Kariobangi 
and Karindundu slum areas, near Korogocho.54 A police 
source told Crisis Group that on the morning of 31 
December, police from Kasarani station collected 38 
 
 
53 Crisis Group interview, Kenya Red Cross officer, Nairobi, 
January 2008. 
54 Crisis Group interview, Kariobangi resident, Nairobi, 
January 2008. 
bodies from the wider Kariobangi area, all believed to be 
Luos forcibly “circumcised” and left bleeding to death.55 
The role of the police in quelling the riots has been 
questionable, with considerable evidence that officers have 
taken sides and used terror tactics against slum dwellers.56 
Kikuyu youths in Mathare 4A area reported that non-
Kikuyu police watched helplessly as their houses were 
torched and property looted.57 The most officers did, they 
claimed, was to shoot in the air to scare away mobs. Non-
Kikuyu victims made similar claims, giving numerous 
examples of people being hacked with machetes and their 
property looted as police watched or mocked the victims. 
In many cases, decisive police action came only when 
officers thought their tribesor those who voted with their 
communities were under siege.58  
One of the worst affected towns was lakeside Kisumu in 
the west, Odinga’s heartland. Again most of those killed 
and displaced were Kikuyus, although scores of Luo 
youngsters are also said to have been shot dead by the 
police.59 Many Luo youngsters took to the streets in rage 
at the election results, burning down shops and cars. Street 
protests quickly degenerated into looting and other acts 
of criminality. The police in Kisumu are especially 
blamed for contributing to the high number of fatalities. 
The Nyanza general hospital confirmed 44 deaths from 
bullet wounds,60 and over 60 people are estimated to 
have died in total.61 This figure has to be treated with 
caution, since some bodies were burnt beyond retrieval 
or buried quickly to conform to Islamic teachings.62 
There have been numerous reports of indiscriminate 
killings by police of people not linked to the protests. A 
boy of thirteen, Salim Ahmed, a class five pupil at a 
primary school in Kisumu, was shot dead by a police 
officer at the Arena playground. Youngsters having fun 
 
 
55 Crisis Group interview, police officer, Nairobi, January 2008. 
56 Press reports even alleged that the General Service Unit – a 
paramilitary unit designed for riot control – used rape as a 
terror tactic, “Outrage at Kenya Police tactics”, BBC News, 18 
January 2008. 
57 Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, January 2008. 
58 There were many exceptions. A police officer in charge of 
Dandora post was singled out by all interviewed for ordering 
his men to form a human barrier between Luo and Kikuyu 
combatants. He averted fighting between the Kikuyu in 
Dandora areas 1, 2 and 3 who wanted to attack Luo 
neighbours who dominate the area. Crisis Group interviews, 
Dandora residents, January 2008. 
59 “Live bullets stirred up lakeside town”, The Sunday 
Standard, 17 February 2008. 
60 Communication to Crisis Group, January 2008. 
61 “Live bullets”, op. cit. 
62 Crisis Group interview, Kisumu residents, January 2008. 
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at a lakeside beach in Nyatike were also gunned down by 
police officers.63 
Violence likewise erupted in the port city of Mombasa, 
which overwhelmingly voted for ODM. However, 
Mombasa has largely escaped large-scale mayhem. Its 
sizeable Luo minority is now allied with the majority 
Muslims, who struck a deal with Odinga shortly before 
the polls. This has made the situation very precarious for 
the large Kikuyu community, but so far, Muslim leaders 
have managed to hold back their co-religionists from 
harming them. This may change, however, if there is not 
a quick settlement to the political crisis.64 
Western Province is another ODM stronghold that has 
witnessed violence, though much less than elsewhere. 
Many Kikuyu businesses and homes were burnt in the 
towns of Kakamega, Bungoma, Busia and Webuye. 12,000 
displaced, small Kikuyu traders escaped over the border 
and are in camps in eastern Uganda.65 
The violence that rocked areas around the town of Kitale, 
such as Cherengani and Kachibora, mainly affected the 
Kisii community and was largely a spillover from 
neighbouring Eldoret. The volatile Mt Elgon region, which 
in the last two years has been gripped by a violent land 
rights campaign led by the Sabaot Land Defence Force, 
remained largely untouched. In the major towns of 
Kakamega, Webuye and Bungoma, many Kikuyu-owned 
shops were burnt down, but individuals were rarely harmed. 
However, many Kikuyu families fled these towns.66  
Even though violence in Western Province was relatively 
low, the police crackdown, especially in Kakamega, 
Bungoma and Webuye, was excessive and brutal. Tens 
of people were killed, some in cold-blooded executions.67 
One bedridden student was shot in the stomach at 
Rosterman Estate in Kakamega. In Maraba, a policeman 
dragged two brothers from a house and shot them in the 
head.68 The killing of a thirteen-year-old boy at Lurambi 
Market, shot by a police officer as the boy was picking 
up a doll from the ground, caused a storm of protest in 
the town.69 Many of the brutal police murders are blamed 
on one notorious criminal investigation officer in the 
Kakamega area, who is said to be running a parallel police 
 
 
63 Crisis Group interview, Kisumu residents, January 2008. 
64 Crisis Group interviews, Mombasa Muslim leaders, January 
2008. 
65 “Uganda: More refugees flee from neighbouring Kenya”, 
IRIN, 16 January 2008. 
66 Crisis Group interviews, residents of Kitale, Kakamega and 
Webuye, January 2008. 
67 Crisis Group interview, Kakamega, January 2008. 
68 Crisis Group interview, Kakamega, January 2008. 
69 Crisis Group interview, Kakamega, January 2008. 
unit, members of which allegedly operate in civilian dress 
and with unmarked cars.70  
A main reason why the police chose heavy-handed tactics 
was to scare the protesters and “hit them hard”, according 
to a local source.71 The police and the paramilitary General 
Service Unit (GSU) have in the past used similar brutal 
tactics to quell rebellion. A crackdown on the Digo 
community in Mombasa’s Likoni area in 1997 caused 
such trauma that a decade later, Digo leaders, despite 
their seething anger at government insensitivity to their 
land plight, are still terrified of any protest that might 
lead to another confrontation with the security forces.72 
B. ESCALATION IN THE RIFT VALLEY 
The region most affected by post-election violence is the 
Rift Valley. Much of the first wave (30 December-10 
January) was in the North Rift and heavily concentrated 
around the villages and small trading centres near Eldoret, 
such as Timboroa, Matharu, Burnt Forest, Tarakwi, 
Makutano and Cheptiret. The violence has been as intense 
further south in Molo, Kedowa and other trading outposts 
in the tea-growing district of Kericho, as well as at the 
border with Kisii Nyanza. In the South Rift, it took a less 
organised, more opportunistic turn later in January, 
resulting from the total collapse of state authority in the 
area. Its victims were predominantly Luo and Kisii settlers, 
many ODM supporters who were attacked by Kalenjin 
neighbours seeking to take their cattle and land.73 Those 
who have borne the brunt of this conflict are dirt-poor 
peasant families and small farmers and traders. They 
fled on lorries, handcarts and bicycles and by foot. IDP 
camps have sprung up everywhere where there is a 
semblance of security – on church compounds, police 
outposts, army garrisons and other government facilities. 
The second wave of violence (24-28 January) hit Nakuru 
and Naivasha after a minor incident between youths 
escalated into a major confrontation between gangs from 
Luo, Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities, ultimately 
requiring the army’s intervention. The Mungiki sect was 
a key driver of the violence in both towns, organising the 
systematic, brutal killings of women and children so as 
to expel Luo and Kalenjin from Kikuyu-dominated areas. 




70 Crisis Group interview, Kakamega, January 2008. 
71 Crisis Group interview, Kakamega, January 2008. 
72 Crisis Group interview, Mombasa, January 2008. 
73 “Chaos in North Rift unmasks historical disputes over land 
and cattle rustling”, Daily Nation, 25 January 2008. 
74 “Nakuru attack victims shot while fleeing”, Sunday Standard, 
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1. The rise of Kalenjin warriors in the North Rift 
The violence in the North Rift region, though sparked by 
the disputed elections, has its roots in deeply entrenched, 
long-festering anti-Kikuyu sentiment within certain 
segments of the Kalenjin, particularly the Nandi and 
Kipsigis communities. They continue to feel aggrieved 
by the settlement of Kikuyus in their home areas after 
independence and often view Kikuyu communities as 
unscrupulous and greedy land-grabbers, who have 
historically manipulated the political system to ensure 
their dominance in commerce and politics.75  
Organised violence 
Barely minutes after the announcement that Kibaki had 
won, Kalenjin youths armed with machetes, arrows and 
jerry cans of kerosene and petrol attacked Kikuyu 
settlements. In less than two hours, large areas with a 
heavy concentration of Kikuyu families near Eldoret were 
ablaze.76 Most of the Kalenjin youth were ferried to the 
attacks by lorries77 and were allegedly paid thousands of 
shillings to carry out the raids. Credible reports obtained 
by Crisis Group suggest multiple sources of funding for 
these operations, mainly from members of the Kalenjin 
political and business establishment of the North Rift 
related to the Moi regime.78  
 
 
75 Moi, a Tugen from Baringo, was made vice president by 
Jomo Kenyatta in 1969 to quell Nandi and Kipsigis opposition 
to the settlement schemes that brought tens of thousands of 
Kikuyu into the North Rift Valley. The land which was 
redistributed to the Kikuyu settlers and taken by senior 
government officials in the North Rift is part of the traditional 
homeland from which Nandi and Kipsigis had been forcibly 
removed by the colonial powers to create space for white 
settlers. After independence, Nandi and Kipsigis landless 
peasants were angered at Kenyatta and Moi, who they 
believed submitted them to a second oppression to benefit new 
foreign settlers, the Kikuyu. David Throup, “The construction 
and destruction of the Kenyatta state”, in Michael Schatzberg 
(ed.), The Political Economy of Kenya (New York, 1987), pp. 
43-46. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Moi only tolerated 
Nandi leaders who accepted the land arrangement he had 
sealed with Kenyatta. Others, like John Marie Seroney in the 
1970s and Bishop Alexander Muge in the 1980s, were 
repressed or killed, François Grignon, “Les années Nyayo: 
Racines de l’autoritarisme et graines de démocratie”, in 
Grignon and Gérard Prunier (eds.), Le Kenya Contemporain 
(Paris, 1998), pp. 315-348. 
76 “Kenya: Opposition Officials Helped Plan Rift Valley 
Violence”, Human Rights Watch, 24 January 2008.  
77 Crisis Group interviews, Eldoret, January 2008 
78 The report of the 2001 Akiwumi Commission recommended 
investigations on a number of individuals believed involved in 
the organisation of the violence in the ethnic clashes of the 
1990s. A number of them, who are ODM parliamentarians, 
may be connected to the recent violence. “Report of the 
In one of the worst incidents during the week-long 
bloodbath, a Kalenjin mob set a church on fire in Eldoret 
on 1 January, killing dozens of frightened Kikuyus who 
had taken shelter. It is not known exactly how many 
perished, but most accounts suggest it could be as many 
as 30. This heightened fears that Kenya’s recurrent ethnic 
violence could be entering a new and more deadly phase, 
similar to the murderous campaign which rocked the 
country in the 1990s.79 However, while as discussed 
further below there was a certain amount of anti-Kikuyu 
incitement by local elders, the suggestion there was a 
systematic, well-orchestrated campaign to purge the region 
of Kikuyus needs to be treated cautiously. In a less 
publicised incident, a Kalenjin mob “hunting for Kikuyus 
to kill” at the University of East Africa, Baraton, was 
persuaded by a lone police officer to disperse, not a likely 
response by an organised group bent on genocide.  
Much of the violence around Eldoret was perpetrated by 
well-organised groups of Kalenjin warriors. These young 
men usually took orders from the elders of their settlements, 
who still wield considerable influence over some sectors of 
rural communities. Young recruits undergo group initiation 
rites (based on age) before achieving “warriorhood” status 
and are sworn to secrecy.80 Each age group, usually 
involving several hundred youths circumcised together, 
has its own name. Members of the Kimnyigei age group 
have reportedly been involved in much of the violence.81  
There is nothing new nor sinister in the existence of these 
groups themselves. Similar initiation rites for young male 
adults exist elsewhere in the country, especially among 
the Maasai, Pokot, Turkana and Samburu and pastoralist 
communities who have retained an age-based division of 
labour. The purpose of the ritual is to cement solidarity 
and courage and instil discipline.  
The “warriors” are cattle herders, farmers and traders, who 
lead a routine existence and are only mobilised when the 
community is believed to be in danger. Warrior units are 
autonomous, non-hierarchical and without central command. 
Since the 1990s in particular, when ethnic clashes were 
organised by senior Kalenjin members of the Moi regime, 
this social institution has, however, been manipulated by 
business people and politicians, often to settle scores with 
perceived enemies. The warriors’ arsenal is predominantly 
traditional – bows and poisoned arrows, spears, machetes 
and clubs. Lately it has included Molotov cocktails. 
 
 
judicial commission appointed to inquire into tribal clashes in 
Kenya”, Nairobi, 2001. 
79 Outside the country, the images recalled to many in the 
international community the memory of the Rwanda genocide; 
while the comparison was not apt, the shock did much to 
stimulate the initial international interest and concern. 
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Some Kalenjin tribes, especially the Tugen and the 
Marakwet, are known to have guns,82 the bulk of which 
were given to them during the later Moi years to help 
them defend themselves against heavily armed cattle 
rustlers from the Pokot community.  
Several informed sources suggest these groups now have 
wealthy athletes as new benefactors.83 The Rift Valley is 
famous for producing world-class long-distance runners. 
The athletes have made fortunes from competing in 
international track and field events and have transformed 
some of the depressed and sleepy rural villages in the 
region by investing in farmland and other real estate. The 
motivation for giving the raiders cash and transport is said 
to be partly economic. They allegedly want the Kikuyus 
evicted so they can take their farms and property. The 
athletes, most of whom have a military background, are 
reportedly also training and sometimes commanding the 
raiders.84 There are various accounts of how Lukas Sang, 
an athlete and ex-army corporal, died, but most accounts 
suggest he met his death on the outskirts of Eldoret while 
commanding part of a Kalenjin raiding party.85 
Some reports allege that the Sabaot Land Defence Force 
(SLDF), a shadowy militia group active in and around 
the Mt Elgon region of western Kenya, has joined with 
their Kalenjin cousins. It has been engaged in its own 
campaign against so-called non-indigenous tribes. Many 
Luhyas, Kikuyus and members of other tribes have been 
attacked, over 600 have died and 60,000 have reportedly 
been displaced in this two-year old conflict.86 The SLDF 
is now the most powerful and best-armed militia group 
operating in the west. Its hit-and-run attacks from the Mt 
Elgon forest are a major challenge for the authorities, who 
appear incapable of quelling the rebellion. The group is 
officially headed by a man called Wycliffe Matakwei 
Kirui Komon,87 but there is speculation the real leader is 
a newly elected ODM parliamentarian from the region, 
though he has denied any links.88  
The SLDF seeks to evict non-indigenous people because it 
considers the region belongs to them and the KAMATUSA 
(an abbreviation of the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and 
Samburu tribes) – a coalition of largely pastoralist tribes 
of the Rift Valley that share a common linguistic and 
cultural heritage. The group is allegedly now arming and 
 
 
82 Crisis Group interviews, Eldoret, January 2008. 
83 Crisis Group interview, Eldoret, January 2008. 
84 Crisis Group interviews, Eldoret, January 2008. 
85 Crisis Group interviews, Eldoret, January 2008. 
86 “Massive internal displacements in Kenya due to politically 
instigated ethnic clashes”, FIDH/KHRC, no. 471/2, April 2007. 
87 “SDLF militia a force to reckon with”, The Standard, 10 
April 2007. 
88 Crisis Group interview, Kitale resident, January 2008. 
training the Kalenjin warriors89 and receives their support 
in an attempt to take control of the Luhya-dominated 
district of Trans Nzoia, which produces the bulk of 
Kenya’s maize. Sabaot militants believe a future Rift 
Valley state within federal Kenya is incomplete without 
Trans Nzoia. The SLDF’s main ambition is to carve the 
agriculturally important Trans Nzoia away from Western 
Province and annex it to the Rift Valley. Their violent 
campaign seeks to cause mass displacement of non-
Sabaots and non-Kalenjins, in the hope that a friendly 
central government will eventually legitimise facts on 
the ground.90 
Land, majimbo and propaganda 
In other areas of the Rift Valley, motivations for the 
violence were not necessarily election related but may 
also have been linked to longstanding competition for 
access to land and jobs. Fighting was reported to spread 
to the South Rift, principally in and around the tea-growing 
district of Kericho and Bomet, as well as the border between 
Borabu and Sotik.91 Kalenjin specifically targeted Kisii 
settlers from over-populated Nyanza Province – a 
community which the militants consider to be as covetous 
of their land as the Kikuyu. They killed over a dozen, and 
many more were executed during the subsequent police 
crackdown.92 
This development reinforces the view that the conflict in 
the Rift Valley is essentially over land. The Kalenjin 
appear determined to reclaim what they see as their 
ancestral lands from the so-called immigrant communities 
such as the Kikuyu and the Kisii. The Kalenjin argue 
that Kikuyus, backed by big land companies and state 
bureaucracy, bought large tracts in the fertile parts of the 
Rift Valley. The Kenyatta regime indeed gave former Mau 
Mau combatants priority to resettle in the Rift Valley as a 
reward for their contribution to independence, but more 
importantly to avoid the continuation of what was mostly 
a Kikuyu civil war over land in Central Province. To protect 
the large properties accumulated by collaborators with the 
colonial regime and members of the establishment in 
Central Province, Kenyatta decided to resettle the Kikuyu 
landless poor and Mau Mau supporters on Kalenjin land 
in the Rift Valley. Kalenjin communities were further 
 
 
89 Crisis Group interview, Kitale resident, January 2008. 
90 Crisis Group interview, Kitale residents, January 2008. 
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2008; and “Gunshots as police battle youths in Sotik”, Sunday 
Nation, 3 February 2008. 
92 “Quiet burial for victims of police brutality”, Sunday Standard, 
17 February 2008. 
Kenya in Crisis 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°137, 21 February 2008 Page 13 
 
 
angered by the renaming of their areas with Kikuyu names, 
thus erasing part of their heritage.93  
The problem is further compounded by a laissez-faire 
system of land sale and allocation, which often takes no 
account of communal tenure and is deeply flawed due to 
corrupt allocation and registration practices. The dream 
of many poor Kenyans to own land has turned into a 
nightmare, with double or triple registration and the 
repeated issue of fake title deeds. The ODM did well in 
the Rift Valley and Coast Province because of its promise 
the two regions would become a self-governing, semi-
autonomous state if it won. The ODM’s majimbo cleverly 
exploited the yearning for regional autonomy among the 
Kalenjin and other so-called minority tribes. But ODM 
did not provide details on what such devolution would 
involve, and many Kalenjins saw majimbo as a chance 
to “throw off the Kikuyu yoke”.94 That view was echoed 
in Coast Province. 
The violence has also involved a certain amount of 
indoctrination and incitement. Politicians and traditional 
chiefs in the Rift Valley have been whipping up anti-
Kikuyu feelings for a long time, and the tempo of their 
incitement was ratcheted up shortly before the polls. The 
net effect was a consistent message that Kikuyus are the 
cause of all the region’s ills. A powerful tribal elder was 
heard making statements that would have seen him 
prosecuted in many countries. Jackson Kibor, a prominent 
Nandi elder and politician in Eldoret, was unapologetic 
over the violence and said to the BBC that the Kalenjin 
have a right to kill Kikuyus. He described the violence in 
the Rift Valley as “a war” and said Kikuyus will never be 
allowed back.95 This chilling message from the traditional 
elders is widely shared by most ordinary Kalenjin.  
Vernacular radio stations may also have played a part in 
whipping up ethnic chauvinism. Kass FM, a Kalenjin 
station beamed to the Rift Valley, is much blamed for 
broadcasting inflammatory statements by politicians and 
ordinary people. A respected clergyman in the Rift Valley, 
Bishop Cornelius Korir, has frequently complained that 
Kass was inciting violence and warned it could provoke 
“Rwanda-style” killings.96 Its broadcasts were mostly 
aired prior to the elections in December. The station, 
aware it is now being watched closely, has since toned 
down its propaganda and is careful not to air anti-Kikuyu 
statements. Many of the ethnic hate messages and much 
of the ethnic stereotyping appeared on live phone-in 
programs. It was common to hear descriptions on Kass 
 
 
93 See for more details, “How State policy shaped land conflict”, 
Saturday Nation, 9 February 2008. 
94 Crisis Group interview, University of Nairobi lecturer, 
January 2008. 
95 Interview for BBC radio, 31 January 2008. 
96 Crisis Group interview, Eldoret resident, January 2008. 
FM before the elections of the Kikuyu as greedy, land-
hungry, domineering and unscrupulous, as well as thinly 
veiled threats, like “the time has come for us to reclaim 
our ancestral land”, or “people of the milk” (Kalenjin) 
must “clear the weed” (Kikuyu).97  
Kikuyu FM stations like Inooro, Coro and Kameme are 
also accused of waging an ethnic propaganda campaign, 
though a more subtle one, against ODM and the Kalenjin. 
Again, much is usually hidden in the phone-ins. Inooro 
FM is particularly notorious for putting highly emotional 
and distraught people from the confrontation areas on 
air. It also inserts into or ends the call-ins with gospel 
songs, an obvious effort to increase the emotional effect. 
“How many people have to die before we say: enough is 
enough. Our people will be exterminated”, a woman 
called Mama Ciiru typically sobbed in one such broadcast 
on Inooro on 23 January 2008.98 
2. The return of Mungiki 
In the second wave of violence to rock the Rift Valley, 
ethnic gangs engaged in deadly combat for control of 
two of the principal towns in the province, Nakuru and 
Naivasha.99 The busy Nairobi-Nakuru highway was 
impassable for a few days, with barricades and ethnic 
militia checkpoints popping up and passengers in buses 
and minibus taxis (matatus) being asked to produce their 
national identity cards and then brutally lynched if they 
belonged to the wrong western tribe.100 Some of those 
murders can be blamed on the notorious Kikuyu crime 
cult, Mungiki. 
The sect has its roots in the Rift Valley but is well 
entrenched in Nairobi slums and central Kenya. 
Membership is gained by swearing oaths (often forced) 
and strictly limited to Kikuyu men. The initial aim was 
the “liberation” of Kikuyus from Moi oppression and a 
cultural revival of the traditional Kikuyu way of life. It 
borrows much from Mau Mau symbolism and argues 
that no one except a Kikuyu should ever rule Kenya. Over 
the years and especially between 1992 and 1997, it has 
had contacts with parliamentarians from central Kenya. 
Though they were sometimes forcibly sworn into the 
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group, they found cooperation with Mungiki useful for 
political mobilisation.101 
Mungiki was in disarray following a mid-2007 crackdown 
by the security forces but is believed to have regrouped and 
is operating openly despite being a banned organisation. 
Speculation about official acquiescence in this resurgence 
is rife.102 Mungiki now casts itself as the defender of the 
beleaguered Kikuyu in the Rift Valley. Its handlers and 
supporters, who are said to include some senior members 
of the Kikuyu elite, want to make it an effective 
counterweight to the Kalenjin warriors, and there are 
reports it is accumulating weapons, including guns.103 The 
sect is also bringing young men from Central Province 
for oathing and then transferring them to the Rift Valley 
for operations.104 
The group is aggressively stepping up the search for new 
members, having deployed recruiters in most of the 
Kikuyu-dominated IDP camps. It is particularly targeting 
vulnerable Kikuyu youngsters displaced by the violence. 
The Mungiki message is stark: it is time for revenge. The 
angry young men in the camps are being manipulated 
into believing counter-violence is their only way out. The 
deadly inter-ethnic clashes that rocked the industrial towns 
of Nakuru and Naivasha are said to have been mostly 
carried out by these new recruits.105 The sect seems to 
enjoy a degree of support from the local establishment 
and police, who used minimal force against them as they 
were torching and killing. Reports that some gangs leading 
the onslaught in the Central Rift are led by members who 
have long been in prison suggests that local authorities 
are releasing some Mungiki convicts.106 
In Naivasha and Nakuru, Mungiki members were guided 
by local youths, who identified houses of non-Kikuyu, 
especially those of Luo and Kalenjin. After the residents 
had been killed or fled, their property was taken outside 
and burned as a sign of cleansing before the house was 
reoccupied by Kikuyu IDPs.107 Similar cases have been 
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“Vigilantes, violence and the politics of public order in 
Kenya”, African Affairs, vol. 101 (2002), pp. 531-555; Peter 
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reported in Thika and Ruiru. In Naivasha the sect is behind 
the ban on women wearing trousers. Operating from land 
which some of its leaders own along the highway, it wants 
to assert its authority over the Kikuyu population.108 Next 
on its agenda would be to force (or at least request) women 
to be circumcised. In Kiambu a few years ago, the sect 
spread leaflets asking all women to do this voluntarily or 
be compelled. It is likely that thousands of adherents wish 
to leave the sect, but memories of beheadings of defectors 
in 2007 serve as a deterrent.109 
There are also reports of the sect being used to hit back 
at Kalenjin warriors in Molo, Nakuru and parts of Rongai, 
as well as in Nyahururu and Laikipia West districts, where 
the Kikuyu have also organised vigilante groups in 
villages. Since the latter is a multi-ethnic area, tension is 
growing between the Kikuyu and the Pokots, Turkana 
and Samburu, whom the Kikuyu accuse of stealing their 
animals. There has already been a strike against Kalenjin 
living in the Ol Jabit area of Laikipia West, who were 
controversially settled in the former Ngobit forest by Moi 
in the late 1990s.110 
The group is also tightening its grip on Nairobi slums and 
public transport. Some city politicians, including former 
parliamentarians and defeated PNU candidates, now 
reportedly work with Mungiki so that they can deploy it 
against ODM and on behalf of Kibaki if the opposition 
continues protest actions. Perceived traitors to the Kikuyu 
cause have become prime targets for intimidation. Kikuyu 
civil society leaders and journalists who have been 
criticising the government and PNU111 receive threatening 
text messages on their mobile phones and risk attack in 
Nairobi’s streets. James Maina, from the People’s Parliament 
organisation, suffered such an attack on 30 January.112  
Mungiki also demands money from landlords in Eastlands 
in return for evicting Luos said to be taking advantage of 
the current crisis and refusing to pay rent. In Kibera, it has 
taken the battle to their enemy’s home ground, penetrating 
the Laini Saba and Soweto areas dominated by Kikuyus 
and the Kamba, where some Kisiis, Luos and Luhyas 
live. Its threats to kill Luos have scared away tenants and 
led to creation of an IDP camp at High Rise estate along 
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Mbagathi Way, where it was reported in early February 
that non-Kikuyu houses had been marked for eviction.113  
There is a concerted move in government/PNU circles to 
justify Mungiki’s involvement in the current mayhem in 
Rift Valley and the city by claiming that ODM has its 
own gang, called “Taliban”.114 Originally a self-defence 
vigilante force, this outlawed, predominantly Luo group 
is said to operate in Mathare, Huruma, Kariobangi and 
Baba Dogo slums in the east of the capital.115 Within 
these areas, it levies protection and other fees and charges 
matatu and taxi operators. It brings together a few hundred 
mainly desperately poor youths native to the city. Taliban 
has no membership oath or cells throughout the country, 
but it does have squads in various slum locations. At the 
Dandora garbage site, it levies fees on dump trucks.116 
Its leader was jailed in 2002 after skirmishes with Mungiki 
over control of these illegal activities, especially levies on 
matatus using Juja road. In those fights, the Mungiki used 
sheer numbers and ruthless tactics to push the Taliban 
back to the slums.117 
Not all violence in Nairobi or Central Province can be 
blamed on Mungiki. Ethnic animosity has contaminated 
all sectors of society and is used to justify the illegal 
occupation of houses and forceful eviction of workers. 
Kikuyu youths can barely tolerate seeing non-Kikuyus 
holding jobs in their locality. Although Mungiki’s Limuru 
cell is reportedly behind the killings of two Bata shoe 
company workers in that area, the incident was probably 
motivated by the desire for better job opportunities.  
In the area of Legeni in Kinoo, non-Kikuyu workers from 
the local factories were targeted. Kikuyu youths in Thika 
and Limuru want the Luos out so they can secure the 
menial construction jobs Luo youths dominate and used 
the presence of IDPs from the Rift Valley as justification 
for the violence. Luo workers were forced to seek shelter 
at Kabete or Tigoni police stations, and hundreds are now 
sending their families out of the city for fear of attacks 
while they remain behind alone. This trend is prevalent 
in Kikuyu and Kabete areas of Nairobi’s outskirts, where 
many of these men work days and spend their nights in 
the relative safety of police stations.118 
Reports also suggest that the use of Mungiki is deeply 
unpopular among the Kikuyu middle class and is 
dividing the PNU establishment. Ministers who are in 
the competition to succeed Kibaki see the sect as a threat 
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which could favour their rivals, and senior internal security 
officials have reportedly warned Central Province 
parliamentarians against supporting it.119 The sect is an 
obvious challenge to state authority and has reportedly 
infiltrated some sections of the police.120 It is stepping up 
extortion of members of the Kikuyu business community 
and is likely to press middle-class estates and rural land 
owners for contributions.121 
3. Coast Province: the next theatre of violence? 
Another area affected by the violent post-election protests 
is the restive Coast Province, a key part of the country 
which has long been a hotbed of Islamist radicalism and 
land militancy and is where the narrative of grievance about 
land, marginalisation and regional and ethnic separatism 
now fashionable in the Rift Valley was born. Government 
insensitivity to an acute land problem has bred resentment 
against watu wa bara (“upcountry people”).  
The rebirth of majimbo as a political idea owes much to 
the Coast region. Within the area, the majority of violence 
has been concentrated in Mombasa, especially its ethnically 
mixed areas of Likoni, Changamwe and parts of the South 
Coast. Over a dozen people were killed when large Luo 
crowds turned on Kikuyus and Kambas.122 Those two 
communities have borne the brunt of the violence, mostly 
orchestrated by well-organised groups from mixed religious 
and ethnic backgrounds. There have been no reports of 
large-scale violence in recent weeks, but there is speculation 
that something is brewing.  
Some reports suggest a militia group is training and re-
organising in the dense coastal jungle of Mulungunipa. 
An ex-army captain, called Omari, is said to be in 
charge.123 In a mirror image of what is happening in the 
Rift Valley, the militia, said to be largely made up of 
Digo but including members from the wider Mijikenda 
tribes, is using traditional rituals such as oathing to instil 
loyalty.124 Some reports suggest it is raising funds by 
crime – the recent crime wave in Mombasa, largely 
hitting tourists and wealthy Europeans, is blamed on it. 
The militia’s aim is said to be twofold: to destroy the 
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Most of the coastal people look at the tourism industry as 
something alien, arguing that the money does not trickle 
down and often ends up in the hands of wealthy foreigners 
and Kikuyu middlemen.126 Among the Mijikenda and 
the Waswahili, it is rare to find anyone with sympathy 
for the hoteliers and tour operators who are now caught 
in the country’s serious economic downturn.127 
 
 
126 Crisis Group interview, Mombasa resident, January 2008. 
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IV. HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES 
Due to the history of small-scale violence that has often 
flared around elections, NGOs, international organisations 
and the government were generally prepared to mitigate 
the immediate humanitarian effects of the crisis. However, 
the economic consequences are alarming and may durably 
harm prospects for recovery. 
A. THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
Assistance to the displaced has primarily been coordinated 
through the Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS, partnered 
with UNICEF), which was on standby in anticipation of 
violence during the election period, and the government. 
The presence of the bulk of UN and international relief 
NGO regional headquarters in Nairobi and the critical 
importance of Kenya as a political and economic partner 
in Eastern Africa and the Horn have been strong 
contributing factors to the speed of the international 
response to the crisis. The level of violence prior to the 
27 December 2007 vote was considerably lower than 
what was anticipated, so a considerable pool of resources 
was still available.  
However, the proliferation of IDP sites has presented a 
considerable challenge. As of 5 February, 310,643 IDPs 
had been registered by the Kenya Red Cross and its 
affiliates in 296 camps countrywide.128 The initial violence 
directed mainly at Kikuyus from the North Rift and parts 
of Western and Nyanza Provinces precipitated flight 
towards major towns in the Rift Valley, Central Province 
and Nairobi’s western outskirts.129 That crisis was 
compounded by a second wave of displacements in late 
January, resulting from violence in new areas, primarily 
against members of tribes associated with the opposition 
but living in pro-government enclaves, and vice versa. 
Residents and agricultural labourers were evicted from 
tea, coffee and flower plantations in Central and Nairobi 
Provinces and parts of the North Rift and pushed back 
towards their western homelands. Similar evictions of 
trades people and farmers in Nyanza and Western 
Provinces forced an exodus in the opposite direction. 
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The current crisis has rekindled historical conflicts. Cattle 
raiding in Trans Nzoia and land clashes around Mt Elgon 
and between Kipsigis (Kalenjins) and Kisiis on the borders 
between Boma and Nyamira districts have taken on a 
new dimension in light of the breakdown of the rule of 
law, producing large numbers of IDPs. The premature 
closure of camps in Nairobi is reported to have contributed 
to the proliferation of smaller camps, particularly in 
churches and chiefs’ compounds. Targeted displacement 
is strongly affecting basic services in health and education, 
as health professionals and teachers are not being spared. 
Many civil servants in communities where their ethnic 
group is not dominant have fled or asked for transfers.130  
The displaced are highly mobile, particularly on the East-
West axis. In early January, most organisations that sent 
assessment teams often found only a few dozen IDPs at 
a site where hundreds had been reported the day before.131 
Several agencies admitted that figures were likely inflated 
due to lack of coordination between the government, 
NGOs and faith-based organisations. The movement of 
persons from feeding sites during the day to more secure 
sites (like chiefs’ camps and police stations) in the evening 
may have produced double counting. It is also suspected 
that churches and provincial authorities may have over-
reported IDPs in order to secure more resources for their 
communities. In the early days, the government and the 
national alliance of churches may have also counted IDPs 
from earlier crises, like those at Mt Elgon and Burnt 
Forest (where there have been IDPs since 1992) and from 
flooding.132 Some donors also confirmed that figures have 
been over-reported in previous Kenyan crises, with the 
reality often being 20 per cent of the reported figures.133 
The collective effort has been hampered by resurging 
violence and transport disruptions, particularly affecting 
those in isolated rural areas.134 To obtain better aid, IDPs 
with some resources are rapidly moving from site to site 
by private means, basing their movements on both rumours 
and reports of political developments. Many of those 
evicted from their lands and homes have sought refuge 
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132 In fact, when the Kenya Red Cross was publishing figures 
in the range of 103,000, government and church figures 
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133 Crisis Group interview, head of a foreign donor agency, 
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roads and the challenge of numerous small groups of IDPs. 
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Uasin Gishu Districts”, OCHA- Kenya, op. cit. 
with friends and family. Such IDPs often have not been 
registered, preventing official assistance from reaching 
them. However, the longer the crisis persists, the more 
quickly the pool of resources will dry up, and the pressures 
on support networks in host communities will become too 
great. The numbers seeking assistance will likely then 
increase.135 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), 75 per cent of the displaced in the Rift Valley 
are destitute.136 Those who do not have access to support 
networks have been forced to wait, relying on charitable 
organisations and individual volunteers for transportation 
help. Upon arrival at ancestral homes, many do not know 
where to go and must rely on camps. Adding to the 
confusion are the mixed signals from government 
regarding mid- and longer-term camps.137 The lack of 
central locations where IDPs can congregate and feel 
safe contributes to the difficulty in assessing IDP needs 
and providing support. Many IDPs prefer to stay in 
smaller, less formal camps thinking they will be lesser 
targets for retaliatory attacks.138 However, this dispersal 
is likely to make them more vulnerable in the long run. 
The KRCS opened a camp outside Naivasha for 6,000 
IDPs, including IDPs hiding on the Naivasha Prison 
grounds. As of 3 February, however, IDPs have refused 
to move there citing insufficient security.139 The 
government’s inability to provide adequate security for 
IDPs is a recurring theme that needs to be addressed 
quickly. However, consolidation of camps must not raise 
the likelihood of further inter-ethnic violence. Profiling 
of specific groups’ needs based on their reasons for 
displacement is also critical to direct adequate aid. The 
rate of sexual assault and rape against children, teens 
and women, often by more than one aggressor, is going 
up in camps and urban areas.140 There is also mounting 
evidence that young girls in the camps are being forced 
to exchange sexual favours for food or clothing. 141 Girls 
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will likely have to drop out of school and marry to escape 
destitution, leaving them vulnerable to abuse by older men. 
Further, the Kenya Red Cross staff active in the IDP camps 
and in the confrontation zones are being targeted on the 
basis of ethnicity. The head of the organisation, Abbas 
Gullet, told a news conference his staff in Nakuru and 
other areas feared for their lives by the maelstrom of 
ethnic revenge killings in the region.142 Other aid agencies 
and NGOs operating in camps in Nairobi have voiced 
similar fears. Insecurity at the camps highlights another 
feature of the conflict: that IDP camps now risk becoming 
incubators of more ethnic jingoism and violence. Agent 
provocateurs see them as ideal locations for recruiting 
militants. They cynically manipulate the raw anger which 
violent displacement and traumatic experience have bred 
in the IDPs. 
There are also reports that the Kenya Red Cross had been 
threatened in places like Limuru, on the outskirts of 
Nairobi, into giving aid to only Kikuyus from the Rift 
Valley. Luos, Kalenjins and Luhyas who fled homes due 
to threats were reportedly denied assistance.143 Many have 
since fled to the west, but it is still alleged that aid is 
unfairly distributed.144 As Kikuyus were the majority of 
the IDPs in the early days, many Kenyans perceive the 
Early Recovery Programs as designed to help people from 
that community. 
Many IDPs have independently returned to “ancestral 
homelands”, preferring to stay with friends, associates 
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144 ODM and PNU parliamentarians (Dr Oburu Oginga, 
ODM/Bondo; Olago Aluoch, ODM/Kisumu Town W.; Fred 
Outa, ODM/Nyando; Alfred Bwire, ODM/Butula; Ababu 
Namwamba, ODM/Budalang’i; David Eseli, PNU/Kilimini; 
and Eugene Wamalwa, PNU/Saboti) accused the government 
of biased allocation of the Ksh 1 billion ($148 million) meant 
for humanitarian assistance to the victims of the post-election 
violence. After a fact-finding mission to Kisumu, they alleged 
that members of the Kikuyu community were favoured, while 
little was being done to assist the 78,000 displaced in Nyanza, 
forcing local leaders to set up a committee, dependent on 
private donations, to evacuate their people from Nairobi, Rift 
Valley and Central Province. The Nyanza provincial 
commissioner has downplayed the accusations, saying the 
situation in Nyanza was under control. “MPs Allege Unfair 
Funds to Chaos Victims”, The Standard, 10 February 2008. 
Parliamentarians Helen Sambili, UDM/Mogotio, and Luka 
Kigen, ODM/Rongai, separately said camps in their areas 
have not received tents, clean drinking water, blankets or food 
and alleged government bias, “IDPs Threaten to Strike”, The 
Standard, 12 February 2008. 
and family rather than in IDP camps. These are fertile 
but already vastly overcrowded areas, hence the original 
exodus. Unless proper resettlement or reintegration 
programs are put in place – accompanied by land reform, 
peacebuilding and community reconciliation activities – 
many will inevitably re-settle in urban centres, increasing 
the tensions there. The gesture of solidarity based purely 
on ethnicity also contributes to polarising the country, 
while there is talk of rising crime in central Kenya caused 
by displaced youths roaming the region.  
A potentially explosive land crisis might also erupt in 
Central Kenya with the arrival of IDPs. While many IDPs 
have never been there before, others are tracing their 
ancestry and identifying distant relatives from whom 
they intend to demand land that grandfathers and great 
grandfathers left when they set out for the Rift Valley. 
Some who left starting in the early 1960s and sold their 
little parcels to buy in the Rift Valley are now knocking 
on the doors of the buyers demanding at least a place to 
put up a house.145 Land prices in places like Kinangop in 
Nyandarua district have shot up, and the problem can only 
be solved by the government buying alternative land for 
IDPs. 
Several humanitarian organizations have confirmed the 
widely held view that most IDPs wish to return to their 
homes. The large proportion of children and women helps 
corroborate this theory as, in many areas, men have 
remained behind to protect their homes and to tend to 
fields. In the Cherangani and Endebess camps, most IDPs 
reportedly would be willing to return as soon as security 
can be guaranteed.146 Many have title deeds or documents 
supporting their claims to their lands and thus do not 
fear losing their holdings. But it is widely believed the 
government cannot guarantee security, despite its claims 
and the announcement of 32 new police posts in the 
conflict-prone areas of the Rift Valley. 
Return is undoubtedly premature at the moment and 
planning for longer-term IDP camps has been inadequate. 
The failure to adequately prepare sites has already led to 
critical health-support problems. According to the Kenya 
Red Cross, many farmers expect to recover from the crisis 
economically within one year if they receive adequate 
support to rebuild homes and put their land back into 
production. Nevertheless, they will need support that is 
not yet available. 
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B. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT 
On 8 January 2008, Finance Minister Amos Kimunya 
announced that he estimated Kenya would lose Ksh 60 
billion ($885 million) due to the post-election crisis. In 
the early days, estimates put daily losses of tax revenues 
at approximately Ksh 2 billion ($29 million).147 This has 
likely increased over the past month as more and more 
sectors of the economy feel the effects of the crisis. Unrest 
in Nakuru, Narok, Kisii, Kakamega and Naivasha has in 
effect paralysed transport, with youths erecting road 
blocks at regular intervals on roads and burning lorries, 
commuter buses and private vehicles. Destruction of 
infrastructure like the railways in Kibera produces a 
multiplier effect in the region, which will require more 
time for recovery.  
Despite the continuing crisis, Minister Kimunya has been 
downplaying the consequences, predicting rapid recovery 
in all sectors except tourism from what he projected as a 
six-month economic slowdown. The government 
apparently will use surplus revenues totalling Ksh 8 
billion ($115 million) to cushion some of the shortfalls 
and has sufficient foreign exchange reserves to prevent 
significant currency depreciation.148 The privatisation 
sale of government shares in Telkom Kenya has provided 
a budgetary boost, which Kimunya says will help pay 
for emergency relief. 
This relative optimism seems directed at restoring investor 
confidence rather than portraying reality. An independent 
economist has said a 2-3 percentage point reduction in 
economic growth from 2007’s 6.1 per cent is likely.149 
Further unrelated, but natural, shocks like the rise in the 
price of oil and basic foodstuffs on world markets will 
likely also increase inflation and the country’s trade deficit. 
The western regions as a whole have been hurt badly from 
the violence. South Nyanza and areas of the North Rift 
Valley are already considered to be among the country’s 
poorest and most vulnerable regions. Commercial 
transporters continue to be reluctant to send goods to 
Nyanza, North Rift and Western Provinces, further 
isolating them economically. The fishing industry – the 
primary source of income for much of lakeshore Nyanza 
– suffered because few lorries were willing to travel from 
Nairobi to collect catches. Whole maize and wheat flour 
prices have increased up to threefold in these areas. Shops 
and cafes have been hesitant to reopen for fear of looting. 
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The price of scarce petrol has skyrocketed. Malnutrition, a 
threat in the best times, is a growing danger.  
Kisumu was hit particularly hard, losing an estimated Ksh 
3 billion ($44 million) in property damages since late 
December 2007. The business district was looted and 
torched, with three supermarkets, two petrol stations and 
countless restaurants and stalls of artisanal workers and 
hawkers destroyed. Many shops and businesses have been 
forced to close and may never reopen. Tuskys Supermarket 
Chain has suspended activities in the town. Over 1,000 
formal-sector jobs have been lost. The Kisumu City 
Business Districts Association estimates the city may 
need twenty years to recover. The lucrative matatu 
industry has been crippled due to insecurity and high 
petrol prices. Trip costs have doubled and trebled in many 
parts.150 
The North Rift is the country’s breadbasket, but as much 
as 20 per cent (300,000 tons) of the cereal crop has not been 
harvested.151 It is estimated that as much as 2,800 metric 
tons of maize, beans and wheat were either destroyed or 
stolen. Preparation of the land for the long rains should 
begin in January; however, due to displacement, as many 
as 20,000 families will be unable to cultivate their farms.152  
Initial estimates were that some 3 million tons of maize 
would be harvested in the 2007/2008 marketing year. It 
is now feared that a combination of poor rains and the 
political unrest will reduce that by as much as 15 per cent. 
In the south eastern lowlands, poor rains may contribute 
to the loss of as much as 70 per cent of the harvest. Despite 
projections that the national reserves would be able to 
sustain food needs for seven months, these shortfalls 
will likely affect long-term food security for the nation 
as a whole, with prices rising as supply declines.153 The 
harvest this year was particularly bad, and provincial 
authorities were already relying on the government for 
food support, which is now not coming through. 
Suba district faced critical health shortages (anti retro-
viral drugs, antibiotics, anti-malarials and IV fluids) 
throughout January. That shortage of medical supplies 
was particularly problematic due to 205 reported cases 
of non-virulent cholera since early December,154 along 
with some of the country’s highest HIV/AIDS infection 
rates and endemic malaria. Although the humanitarian 
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crisis is currently under control, discrepancies in access 
to aid and the economic consequences of the violence 
risk turning the Rift Valley and the west into long-term 
disaster areas. 
The government is likely to receive severely reduced tax 
revenues due to disruptions in manufacturing, transport, 
tourism, banking and horticulture, meaning it will have 
to resort to increased domestic and foreign borrowing. 
Road insecurity and loss of transport infrastructure have 
widespread ramifications on all economic sectors. The 
weakening shilling and rising cost of fuel are already 
causing rapid inflation. Protesters and criminals seem to 
be overwhelming police and military efforts to secure 
major transport arteries. Unshipped cargo containers are 
accumulating in the port of Mombasa,155 while trucks 
are piling up at almost all major stops from Uganda to the 
coast. Prices for basic goods in isolated areas and urban 
slums have already trebled.  
Companies which hire many employees from across ethnic 
lines are faced with setting up reconciliation processes, 
as growing distrust between colleagues is affecting 
productivity. Those with branches across Kenya have 
now been forced to transfer staff rapidly to areas deemed 
safe for particular tribes.156 Flower farming, a major export 
sector, is already facing losses running into the millions 
of dollars, as employees have been displaced and flowers 
waste due to transport interruptions. While the Kenya 
Flower Council insisted that all farms were producing 
and exporting. those in Equator, Panacol, Maji Mazuri, 
Mt Elgon and Soloboit are forced to ship to Nakuru by 
armed convoys as the Nakuru–Eldoret road is considered 
unsafe. Increased investment in security, diminished 
production due to worker scarcity and alterations in 
transport have all increased production costs.  
Flower income losses since early January are estimated 
to be in the Ksh 1 billion ($14.5 million) range,157 and 
overseas customers are expressing concern about Kenya’s 
long-term supply reliability.158 The violence in Naivasha, 
where 74 per cent of the rose exports originate,159 does 
not bode well for the industry. The industry anticipates 
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18,000 containers, 1,000 short of its capacity. 
156 “Corporate Kenya finally faces reality of tribalism”, The East 
African, 14 January 2008. 
157 “Horticulture players decry Naivasha violence”, 98.4 Capital 
News, 28 January 2008. 
158 “Kenya flower buyers get jitters despite continuing supply”, 
The East African, 28 January 2008. 
159 “Horticulture players decry Naivasha violence”, 98.4 Capital 
News, 28 January 2008. 
cutting production and jobs if the situation does not 
improve.160  
The tea sector has similar problems, compounded by a 
pre-existing crisis arising from a strong shilling which 
reduced exports in late 2007. Despite the recent fall in 
the shilling’s value, rising transport costs and diminished 
production due to worker scarcity has already resulted in 
losses in the billions of shillings.161 The transport sector’s 
unreliability affects production areas. Nakuru, Naivasha 
and Kericho, the centres of milk production, are incurring 
heavy losses due to product wastage as the roads to the 
facilities are blocked.162 Central Province is unable to get 
its potatoes, tomatoes and other goods to markets. Passion 
fruit farmers in the North Rift have reportedly been forced 
to sell at a loss to Ugandan traders due to blocked routes 
and are said to be losing Ksh 4 million ($59,000) weekly. 
The hardest-hit sector has been tourism, which is the 
largest foreign exchange earner and was about to come 
into its peak season at Christmas. Coastal resorts and 
game parks are nearly deserted, with occupancy rates 
around 20 per cent instead of the usual over 85 per cent.163 
Cancellations are extending into the middle of the year. 
Layoffs in the 250,000-strong workforce have already 
begun and more are likely.164 The industry normally 
generates roughly Ksh 20 billion ($295 million) in annual 
tax revenues but is requesting Ksh 1 billion ($14 million) 
from the government to help in the recovery. 165 The U.S., 
UK and EU are unlikely to lift travel advisories until a 
political resolution is reached, and the negative international 
publicity means it will probably be years before tourism 
returns to pre-crisis levels. 
Fears of targeted violence against specific Kikuyu 
businesses are also gaining ground. On the third day of 
the ODM mass action (18 January 2008), rioters in Kibera 
uprooted 2km of the Mombasa-Kampala railway, which 
passes through the slum. This seems to have been a 
deliberate message to Kibaki associates who partly own 
the Rift Valley Railways,166combined with a desire to 
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loot wheat containers on the track. The destruction of the 
rail line disrupted supplies to western parts of the country 
and Uganda, forcing rerouting to insecure roads. It was 
followed by destruction of 2km of the Kisumu-Butere 
railway on 28 January. The vandals in Kisumu were 
reported to chant: “No Raila, No Railway!”167 These 
events display the opposition’s capacity and willingness 
to destroy strategic economic assets and show how the 
situation could further deteriorate.  
An unprecedented suspension in trading on the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange on 29 January 2008 strongly indicated a 
rapid decline in investor confidence. The suspension 
happened at 11:52am, when a lack of buyers and midday 
selling pushed the market near the fail-safe point of 5 
per cent loss and invoked a previously unused rule to 
halt trading. The exchange lost Ksh 40 billion ($590 
million) that day. Even when business resumed after the 
midday halt, demand was low. Some of the biggest losers 
were East African Breweries, Barclays, Kenya Commercial 
Bank, KenGen, Equity Bank, DTB, CFC and Mumias.168  
The economic pressures of the crisis are being felt not only 
in Kenya but also in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo 
and southern Sudan. Kenya is a transit point for a quarter 
of the gross domestic product (GDP) of Rwanda and 
Uganda and one third of Burundi’s. The targeting of 
Ugandan lorries in Kenya due to rumours of that country’s 
military involvement in the west has also posed problems. 
Fuel shortages at one point prompted Uganda to suspend 
domestic flights.169 Dar es Salaam, the other major East 
African port, has been unable to handle additional trade 
due to slow clearance. The crisis will force landlocked 
East African countries to re-evaluate their dependence on 
Kenya for imports and exports and consider a Tanzanian 
route if that country’s infrastructure is improved. Meanwhile, 
the paralysing effect of the crisis on the rest of the East 
African Community prompted its chair, Uganda’s President 
Yoweri Museveni, to meet Kibaki and Odinga in Kenya 
on 22-24 January to press for a rapid resolution. 
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V. THE SEARCH FOR POLITICAL 
SOLUTIONS 
The Kenya violence was triggered by the rigging of the 
presidential elections. The election dispute created a crisis 
of authority and legitimacy for all government institutions, 
particularly in opposition-dominated areas. Law 
enforcement, the judiciary, and the electoral commission 
itself appeared immediately so compromised that for 
ODM supporters violence was perceived as the only 
option for resolving both the electoral dispute and other 
longstanding grievances. Government institutions could 
no longer be part of the solution but were seen as part of 
the problem. Only a political settlement that restores both 
state legitimacy and state authority throughout the country, 
therefore, can offer a viable end to the crisis. 
A. FIRST ATTEMPT AT A POLITICAL 
SETTLEMENT 
Soon after the violence started, a discreet attempt at a 
political deal between ODM and PNU was initiated with 
the support of influential members of the Kikuyu business 
community, facilitated by the World Bank resident 
representative, Colin Bruce.170 A significant section of 
that elite understood at once the economic damage the 
crisis could cause and its longlasting implications. This 
group of CEOs and owners of flower farms, hotels and 
coffee estates has benefited from the Kibaki administration’s 
economic liberalisation, improved infrastructure, a tourism 
boom and exponential growth of agro industry and the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange. It is generally supportive of 
Kibaki’s policies and funded his campaign, but it is not 
the prime beneficiary of his patronage. The initiative was 
intended to operate between the parties through trusted 
intermediaries and so bypass the hawkish gatekeepers 
who guard access to the president and benefit most from 
his patronage. The go-betweens, chosen for ability to 
interact one-on-one with Kibaki, emphasised that the 
need for power sharing with Odinga.171 
The negotiation was well advanced when African Union 
(AU) Chair John Kufuor, arrived in the country on 8 
Janaury 2008. A document detailing “Principles of 
Agreement” was to be signed in the parliament on 10 
January 2008, the day of his departure, in order to establish 
the basis of a process designed to address the root causes 
of the violence and the electoral dispute, as well as provide 
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Pave Way for Annan”, The East African, 14 January 2008; and 
Crisis Group interviews, senior diplomats, Nairobi, January 2008. 
171 Crisis Group interviews, senior ODM officials, Nairobi, 
January 2008. 
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a political settlement. But before the ceremony could 
take place, hardliners in the Kibaki camp convinced the 
president to disown the document.172 
That document, which went through ten rounds of 
negotiations in the full knowledge of and with the apparent 
support of Kibaki,173 detailed a mutual commitment to 
restore the rule of law and stability rapidly. It recognised 
that the electoral commission’s tallying, compilation and 
declaration of results was problematic and proposed a 
“credible, independent and impartial [process] which 
shall not be subject to control by either party, and whose 
findings and recommendations [the parties] agree to be 
bound by”. The goals of that process notably included: 
 to inquire into the conduct of the ECK and the 
role of the observers in the conduct of the 
presidential elections including the declaration of 
results; to identify remedial action to ensure the 
ECK independence, impartiality, capacity and 
effectiveness in discharging its constitutional and 
statutory mandate; to determine whether a rerun 
of the presidential election is necessary and if so 
to provide the timeframe and modalities; and 
 to make recommendations on the government 
structure pending a new election or otherwise. 
The document also included agreement that the process 
would be carried out by a panel of eminent Africans, who 
would submit their findings and binding recommendations 
within 30 days. In the interim, it provided for a coalition 
government based on equal representation of both parties 
in numbers and portfolio. Government activities would be 
subject to mutual agreement, and both parties committed 
to pass the laws required for implementation in parliament. 
The document was to be signed by Kibaki and Odinga, 
witnessed by the AU’s Kufuor, UK High Commissioner 
Adam Wood, U.S. Ambassador Michael Ranneberger and 
French Ambassador and local EU President Elisabeth 
Barbier.174 
This document appeared to provide two of the essential 
pillars for resolution of the crisis: an independent 
investigation into the electoral dispute, with recommendations 
on the measures and time frame needed to organise a rerun 
if the first count was found to be invalid; and a power-
sharing arrangement between ODM and PNU while 
reforms and preparations for a rerun were to be carried 
 
 
172 Crisis Group interviews, senior diplomats, Nairobi, January 
2008. 
173 Ibid. This was, however, vehemently denied by the 
government’s spokesperson, “Principle of Agreement fake”, 
statement by Dr Alfred Mutua, 11 January 2008.  
174 The “Principles of Agreement” memorandum. 
out. But the PNU camp was unwilling to accept a 
process that risked invalidating Kibaki’s election.  
The imbalance of power between an entrenched head of 
state and a leader of opposition has made the negotiation 
of a political settlement extremely difficult. Kenya’s 
institutions are weighted towards the PNU coalition despite 
its defeat in the parliamentary elections. The constitution 
does not provide a credible judicial process for resolving 
electoral disputes. While presidential and parliamentary 
candidates may need to prepare for lengthy court 
proceedings if petitions are filed, they enjoy all the benefits 
of office once declared winners and have no incentive to 
make concessions. 
B. THE BALANCE OF FORCES 
President Kibaki and his aides are firmly in control of 
the state machinery. They have appointed most senior 
officials over five years in the judiciary, police, intelligence 
services, administration and army. Even if discontent 
exists in the lower ranks, the prospect of a mutiny, coup 
or rebellion of a section of that machinery is unlikely at 
this stage. The most significant disobedience that has 
occurred and may continue is the turning of a blind eye 
to the violence or refusal of repressive orders by a segment 
of the security services. The group that controls decision-
making at State House175 and benefits from state patronage 
seems determined to stay in office for the next five years 
with little changes to its system. The PNU leadership’s 
strategy appears to have five key components: 
 tame the ODM and its allies through heavy-handed 
repression against demonstrators, extrajudicial 
killings if necessary, intimidation and occasional 
corruption176 so as to show the opposition it can 
expect no concessions; 
 claim that ODM prepared the Rift Valley violence 
in advance,177 and give priority to peace, dialogue 
 
 
175 Five individuals are reputed to control access to Kibaki and 
be responsible for the decision-making process: Minister for 
Constitutional Affairs Martha Karua (Kikuyu); Minister for 
Finance Amos Kimunya (Kikuyu, with close connections to 
hawkish businessman and Nairobi University Vice-Chancellor 
Joe Wanjui, also Kikuyu); Minister for Roads John Michuki 
(Kikuyu); former Minister of State for Defence Njenga Karume 
(Kikuyu); and presidential adviser Nathaniel Kang’ethe (Kikuyu). 
176 ODM feared the buying of its parliamentarians by PNU 
ahead of the election of the speaker and tried to impose a 
public vote so that any defector would immediately identified.  
177 “Government is investigating pre-meditated murder”, 
statement by the government’s spokesperson, Dr Alfred 
Mutua, 7 January 2008. A questionable document entitled 
“Executive brief on the positioning and marketing of the Orange 
Democratic Movement and ‘the people’s president’ Raila 
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and reconciliation178 while maintaining that electoral 
disputes can only be settled in courts;179  
 return to “business as usual”, so as to progressively 
weaken the internal and external pressure on the 
government and increase its legitimacy;180 
 invalidate any claim of illegitimate election results, 
using allies within the electoral commission and 
supporters in the print and electronic media;181 and 
 consolidate a political alliance with the leadership 
of the central and eastern parts of the country 
(Musyoka, ODM-K’s presidential candidate, was 
appointed vice-president on 8 January 2008), while 
reinforcing its own power base.  
The assassination of the ODM Nairobi Embakasi 
parliamentarian Melitus Were on 29 January was widely 
perceived as a key element in the hardliners’ intimidation 
strategy.182 Claimed by members of the Mungiki sect, it 
 
 
Odinga” and dated 8 September 2007 also started to circulate 
on the internet in early January 2008, purporting to show that 
ODM included incitement to ethnic hatred as part of its electoral 
strategy.  
178 “Dialogue: President Kibaki invites Raila Odinga for a 
meeting”, statement by the government’s spokesperson, Dr 
Alfred Mutua, 7 January 2008. 
179 “Kibaki tells African leaders he represents Kenyan 
majority”, Agence France-Presse, 1 February 2008. 
180 “Government restoring security and stability in the country”, 
statement by the government’s spokesperson, Dr Alfred Mutua, 
31 January 2008. 
181 Moses Kuria, Dr Josephine Odhiambo and Danson 
Mungatana, “Kibaki won fair and square”, advertisers’ 
announcement, The Standard, 16 January 2008; Electoral 
Commission of Kenya, “ECK response to allegations contained 
in a newspaper advertisement published in the Sunday Nation 
and The Standard Newspapers on January 19, 2008”, Daily 
Nation, 25 January 2008; and Government of Kenya, “Let us 
respect ECK’s verdict”, The Standard, 25 January 2008. 
182 Kenya has a long and unfortunate history of political 
assassination of opposition leaders (including Tom Mboya, 
Pio Gama Pinto, JM Kariuki, Robert Ouko and Archbishop 
Alexander Muge). The perception that PNU is using such a 
tactic is specifically related to two incidents which occurred 
during the Kibaki presidency. First was the assassination of Dr 
Crispin Odhiambo Mbai, an Odinga adviser who was killed in 
unclear circumstances during the negotiations for the Bomas 
constitutional conference. Second were the press revelations 
regarding the “Artur” saga: the arrival into the country of two 
Armenian criminals sought by Interpol, allegedly to execute 
opposition politicians among other criminal activities. The 
movements of the two Armenians appeared to have been 
facilitated by senior government officials; they had government 
number plates on their stolen cars, obtained Kenyan passports 
and were responsible for a violent raid against The Standard 
Group of newspapers in what was “a Government operation”, 
according to the former internal security minister, John 
Michuki. “Gideon Moi on top of Artur’s list”, The Standard, 
provided the first casualty among ODM senior figures but 
was soon followed by a second. On 31 January, David 
Kimutai Too, another ODM parliamentarian, was killed 
by a police officer in unclear circumstances. The two 
deaths reduced ODM’s majority in parliament, leaving 
the coalitions almost equal.183  
Simultaneously, the government used the humanitarian 
crisis first to create international leverage against the 
opposition and then to support its claim that it was in 
control and had quickly restored calm. The movement in 
early January of a few hundred IDPs out of the North 
Rift by government-sponsored convoys and airlifts served 
to divert international media attention from the flawed 
election to the ethnically based violence. The official 
figure of 250,000 IDPs released during the second week 
of the month was questionable: senior humanitarian 
officials believe there might not have been more than 
50,000-60,000 such persons at that time.184 The closure 
of camps in Nairobi and Mombasa and the downward 
adjustment of IDP figures in the week of 24 January, 
rather than reflecting a trend towards voluntary return, 
was similarly a government signal to the international 
community that it was fully capable of stabilising the 
situation, and one timed to coincide with the heightened 
media attention produced by the arrival of Kofi Annan’s 
mediation team.  
A propaganda campaign was launched in the national 
media at the same time, including multiple “peace 
messages” blaming the crisis on ODM. In one offering 
from the Office of Government Communication, a child 
was heard saying, “Mummy says mass action will stop 
tourists from coming to see our beautiful country….Please 
ODM stop mass action”.185  
Despite its victory in the election of the parliament speaker, 
ODM seems to have concluded it had little option for 
putting pressure on the government other than a combination 
of mass action, violence and internationalisation of the 
crisis. Its calls for mass action did not bring large numbers 
of demonstrators on to the streets of the capital but 
produced enough negative media images to keep 
 
 
16 April 2007; “Artur – we were hired to take out leaders”, The 
Standard, 12 February 2007; and “Kenya: Murder most foul 
again”, Africa Confidential, vol. 44, no. 19, 26 September 2003. 
183 Emuhaya parliamentarian Kenneth Marende was elected 
speaker, 105-102. ODM has a small lead over the PNU 
coalition as a result of the division of seats made on the basis 
of party strength, from which it gains an additional six against 
the PNU’s three, ODM-K’s two and KANU’s one. “Kenya: 
ECK Now Gets Final List of Party Nominees”, The Standard, 
7 February 2008. 
184 Crisis Group interview, senior international humanitarian 
officials, January 2008. 
185 TV spot broadcast on national media, January 2008. 
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international attention alive, maintain travel advisories 
and generate continuing diplomatic pressure. However, 
senior ODM officials remain convinced that unless they 
hurt the Kibaki establishment’s property and sources of 
income, it will not make concessions. They believe time 
is against them and that they need quick progress to have 
a possibility to achieve a power-sharing agreement. 
Their strategy started with invalidation of the presidential 
results, the first step in claiming a share of executive 
power. If the results were declared invalid and the 
principle of power sharing was accepted, they would be 
in a position by virtue of their control of parliament to 
expand their parliamentary majority by sharing the spoils 
of power. A constitutional amendment would limit 
presidential prerogatives to formal state functions, and 
cabinet posts would be distributed based on parties’ 
parliamentary strength. A political parties act would 
prevent legislators from changing parties without the 
consent of their leadership, and all senior official 
appointments would be vetted by a parliamentary 
commission. These prerogatives could be distributed to 
smaller parties, possibly enough to reach the two-thirds 
majority needed to produce constitutional review. The 
position of prime minister could be created, and any 
action of the defence council would require parliamentary 
approval.186  
The ODM team has learned that a repetition of the Rift 
Valley violence against Kikuyu communities would 
endanger its political legitimacy and lose it international 
sympathy and thus leverage. Nevertheless, the situation on 
the ground remains extremely tense; the Kalenjin warriors 
are unlikely to accept the return of displaced Kikuyu 
families to lands they covet. Kalenjin politicians are 
giving lip service to peace initiatives and appealing for 
calm in public meetings, but local leaders and traditional 
chiefs are making highly inflammatory statements. 
Similarly, Odinga is under pressure from his extremist base 
in Kisumu to settle for nothing less than the presidency 
so the recent violence – and 40 years of perceived Luo 
marginalisation – can be avenged. Extremists and militias 
are preparing for a new confrontation in both camps, and 
ODM believes that if international mediation fails, its only 
protection against repression and hope for a settlement 
will be its capacity to raise the stakes through violence. 
 
 
186 Crisis Group interview, senior ODM official, January 2008. 
C. ROUND TWO OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 
Before leaving Kenya, the AU chair announced he would 
leave the mediation to a Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan and including former Tanzanian President 
Benjamin Mkapa and human rights leader and former 
first lady of Mozambique and South Africa Graca Machel. 
It arrived on 22 January 2008 and immediately restored 
hope in the possibility of a negotiated settlement. After 
an intensive consultations and visits to the areas affected 
by violence, it arranged a Kibaki-Odinga meeting, 
followed by rapid agreement on the format and agenda 
of negotiations.  
On 28 January, the parties committed to finalise within 
two weeks’ negotiations on the first three items of the 
agenda: immediate action to stop violence and restore 
fundamental rights and liberties; immediate measures to 
address the humanitarian crisis and promote reconciliation 
and healing; and how to overcome the political crisis. 
The fourth agenda item – long-term issues and solutions 
– which should address “the underlying causes of the 
prevailing social tensions, instability and cycle of violence”, 
would be settled within one year. Both camps rapidly 
named delegations.187 
Learning from the failure of the first initiative, the panel’s 
strategy seems to have been to build confidence in the 
process by reassuring PNU and the government on its 
objective. Both the name given to the talks – “Kenyan 
national dialogue and reconciliation” – and the sequence 
of the issues on the agreed agenda were concessions 
which put emphasis on the violence and downplayed the 
importance of a settlement to the electoral dispute. The 
agenda states, for example: “The current crisis revolves, 
in large measure, around the issues of power and the 
functioning of state institutions. Its resolution may require 
adjustments to the current constitutional, legal and 
institutional frameworks”.188 It has no mention of the 
possibility of reviewing the election outcome. 
By 4 February, there was progress on general principles. As 
the country seemed to return slowly to calm, the mediation 
obtained commitments in principle from both sides on 
ending the violence and addressing the humanitarian crisis. 
 
 
187 Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs Martha Karua 
(PNU), Minister for Education Sam Ongeri (KANU), Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Moses Wetangula (FORD-Kenya) and 
ODM-K’s Mbooni parliamentarian, Mutula Kilonzo, for 
Kibaki; “Pentagon” members Musalia Mudavadi and William 
Ruto, new Aldai parliamentarian Sally Kosgei and Ugenya 
parliamentarian James Orengo, for Odinga. 
188 “Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Annotated 
Agenda and Timetable”, mimeo, 28 January 2008. 
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Despite the absence of a reference to modalities such as 
institutional framework, division of labour, timetable 
and external guarantees required to implement pledges 
such as “all illegal armed groups and militias should be 
demobilised and disbanded”, the mediation seemed to 
be moving the process and building confidence.  
By 11 February, there was some progress on the details of 
the third agenda item. Following a third meeting between 
Kibaki, Odinga and Annan, agreement was reached that 
only a political settlement could end the crisis. The PNU 
camp dropped its argument that ODM’s only recourse on 
the election result was to go to court. ODM dropped its 
demand for Kibaki to step down and for a rerun of the 
presidential election within three months. 
Despite these concessions, the parties remained far apart, 
as ODM proposed an arrangement close to the Westminster 
system of government, with an executive prime minister 
and two deputies, separation between the functions of 
head of state and head of government and a government 
formed proportional to each party’s strength in parliament 
and responsible only to parliament. PNU rejected any 
sharing of executive powers, which it insisted should 
remain largely vested in the presidency, but agreed to 
include ODM ministers in a government of national unity. 
The most concrete agreements were creation of a truth, 
justice and reconciliation commission to investigate the 
violence and propose solutions to end it; and establishment 
of an independent review commission of national and 
international electoral experts to investigate all aspects of 
the 27 December presidential elections and recommend a 
better process.189 The mediation strategy contributed to 
restoration of temporary calm but left unaddressed the 
process of implementation necessary to consolidate the 
temporary lull, thus giving the government leeway to 
proceed with its own policies in the Rift Valley in the 
absence of control from potential national or international 
guarantors of the negotiated agreement. As the negotiations 
reached a deadlock on power sharing, one side was able 
to run the country free from checks and balances and to 
ignore the electoral dispute.  
 
 
189 “Annan deal could be struck in 48-72 hours”, The Standard, 
12 February 2008. 
D. REBUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY 
The formal phase of negotiations ended on 12 February 
but, since a consensus had emerged that negotiations 
were the only way out of the crisis, they continued. The 
panel announced a breakthrough was anticipated. Annan 
confirmed to the parties that he would personally lead 
the negotiations for several more weeks if necessary.190 
At the same time, the mediation began consultations with 
donors for establishment of a permanent secretariat over 
six months and in two days received commitments from 
Sweden, Norway and the U.S.191 
1. The challenges of a power-sharing agreement 
The negotiation on power sharing has drawn the 
concentrated attention of the mediation, the international 
community and, to a large extent, Kenya as a whole. The 
U.S., the EU and the AU have all thrown their weight 
behind the mediation team and the negotiations “as the 
only game in town”.192 Attempts at diversions initiated 
by the government through a regional summit or creation 
of a national process have been contained. 
Still, a power-sharing agreement will not be enough to 
restore the democratic process and genuine stability. Time 
plays in the government’s favour. Every day that passes 
makes the Kibaki administration more comfortable in its 
position and gives the impression that the country has 
returned to normal, making it increasingly difficult to 
obtain genuine PNU concessions. The government’s 
rejection of well-respected South African negotiator 
Cyril Ramaphosa was most likely intended to disturb Kofi 
Annan’s work plan, bring the talks to a standstill and wear 
out both ODM’s and the international community’s 
resolve to find a political settlement. Since the government 
would likely have rejected any other negotiator, Annan’s 
only option was to lead the talks himself. 
A genuine power-sharing agreement within the executive 
may itself require a fairly detailed and comprehensive 
negotiation process, the principle of which has not yet 
been agreed. It not only involves concurrence on the 
creation and distribution of positions, but also implies the 
clear definition of responsibilities for each, of relations 
between the head of state and head of government and 
of accountability modalities to parliament. It further 
requires agreement on a reshuffling of senior civil 
 
 
190 “Annan’s rapid diplomacy confounds sceptics”, The East 
African, 4 February 2008.  
191 Crisis Group interviews, foreign missions, Nairobi, February 
2008. 
192 Crisis Group interviews, senior U.S. and EU officials, 
February 2008. 
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servants, especially within the treasury and security 
services, and clear agreements of the decision-making 
process for allocating resources and using the security 
services. The only genuine guarantee for implementing 
such a comprehensive agreement would be a constitutional 
amendment. 
Such a negotiation, if between parties of equal strength 
and committed to a speedy resolution, might require 
several weeks. But again, the government has a strong 
interest in dragging its feet as long as it does not endanger 
its credibility. So far, neither the loss of life and damage 
to the economy nor international pressure have cost the 
hardliners surrounding the president significantly.193 If 
the talks drag on with no concrete results, ODM may 
eventually conclude it has no option but to go back to the 
streets and increase the costs through violence. If there is 
to be a genuine breakthrough, therefore, it is essential 
that the mediation and the international community create 
both incentives and costs for the parties. The imbalance 
of power between ODM and PNU is such that pressure 
and targeting of individuals responsible for delaying and 
blocking the process will remain an absolute necessity. 
Unless the international community rapidly increases 
the costs for the known hardliners and spoilers of the 
negotiations, the chance of their successful conclusion 
will remain small.  
2. Incentives and dividends 
Three complementary negotiations are required to provide 
both incentives for the continuing negotiations on power-
sharing details and guarantees that their outcome will 
meet the requirements of peacebuilding. Lessons have to 
be learned from the experience of the 2002 MoU on the 
election platform that originally brought Kibaki to power. 
Implementation of that document produced disagreements 
over carrying out power sharing, the constitutional 
review process and economic policy. If power sharing is 
sealed this time by a constitutional amendment, all these 
matters should already have been negotiated as a matter 
of priority, not put off to a year-long process. For this to 
happen, continued international pressure will be essential.  
 
 
193 The Kikuyu establishment is known for paying little heed 
to the suffering of its own tribe. “They could not care less”, a 
well-informed observer of the national political scene said. “At 
the peak of the crisis, you would find them totally unconcerned, 
commenting on their golf performance and enjoying their 
usual drinks in the confines of their expensive clubs”. It is 
generally assumed it supported the rigging of the presidential 
election, in knowledge of the consequences for the settlers of 
the Rift Valley. Crisis Group interview, senior political 
analyst, Nairobi, January 2008. 
Constitutional and legal reforms 
Both sides have already agreed that constitutional and 
legal reforms are necessary, including a complete review 
of the electoral framework. However, the parties are likely 
to be more interested in consolidating their own share of 
power than providing the new foundations for Kenya’s 
democracy. Constitutional review has been on the political 
agenda for fifteen years without significant results, thanks 
to presidential manipulation. Negotiation on the details of 
the reforms that need to be passed during the transition 
period and on the exact process of their adoption should 
start immediately and involve civil society stakeholders, 
who have actively engaged on these matters in the past 
and can balance the narrow political interests of ODM 
and PNU. 
The constitutional reforms should include rebalancing 
power between the three branches of government and 
address the issue of devolution. Further, the confusion 
over majimbo greatly contributed to the rise in tensions, 
and it would be dangerous to move to new elections without 
clarifying that issue. Its satisfactory settlement in the 
context of an internationally supported negotiation would 
also be a major incentive for ODM to stay committed to 
the process and refrain from violence. Simultaneously, 
constitutional provisions should be introduced to guarantee 
the independence of the Central Bank and thus reduce 
the influence of electoral politics on macro-economic 
management. This would be a major incentive for PNU 
to remain committed, since constitutional guarantees 
could protect economic liberalisation against ODM’s 
regulatory and statist tendencies.  
As noted, there is agreement to an internationally supported 
investigation into what happened during the 27 December 
election that will also make recommendations for the 
future. This process should address the legal and 
constitutional reforms necessary to prevent another such 
fraud and to restore the credibility of the electoral process. 
The keys are to strengthen the ECK’s budgetary and 
administrative independence, including detailed, apolitical 
procedures for appointment of its commissioners and to 
empower the judiciary to become a credible arbitrator of 
electoral disputes, including by reforming the process 
for appointing judges. To ensure political stability, the 
electoral system itself might also need to be modified to 
require the president to obtain at least 50 per cent of the 
vote, if necessary in a run-off election.  
Economic reform 
An agreement on the economic policies to be implemented 
during the transition period, determined in consultation 
with major economic stakeholders, is essential for 
national and international confidence in the transition 
process. It is also necessary as an incentive for the 
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hardline constituencies behind both Kibaki and Odinga. 
Kikuyu business leaders require assurances about ODM’s 
economic policies, its commitment to liberal reforms 
and the honouring of legal and transparent contracts 
awarded under Kibaki’s presidency. Such an agreement 
would guarantee the stability of the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
and confidence in national economic management. 
Simultaneously, as an incentive to the ODM constituencies 
in Western Kenya and the Rift Valley, job creation policies 
and allocation of resources for the least developed regions 
of the country must also be included.  
Private sector representatives, including the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers and Kenya Federation of 
Employers, have indicated they would be ready to 
implement vigorous job creation policies in lesser 
developed areas if they received tax rebates. They should 
be brought into the negotiations on the transitional 
government’s economic policies. A land acquisition and 
redistribution framework beneficial to the communities 
which have been most aggrieved since independence 
must be on the transition’s agenda as an immediate 
peacebuilding incentive. The “willing buyer, willing 
seller” policy, which favours the richest communities, 
needs to be ended. While respecting property rights, the 
government, with donor help, must allocate resources, 
such as land and basic services, to address inequalities. 
Ending the violence and resettling IDPs 
It will also be critical to initiate separate consultations on 
how to implement the commitments already made for 
ending the violence. The negotiating teams in Nairobi and 
the national political leaderships do not control the drivers 
of the violence on the ground. They can only influence 
them if local leaders perceive that their grievances are being 
addressed. Engagement with community leaders who 
have authority over those carrying out the violence is 
essential. The outcome of these consultations should be 
brought back to the central negotiating table, so that 
political agreements will be realistic and informed by 
ground truth.  
A credible institutional framework for disarming and 
dismantling all party-supported militias is also required. 
Kenya cannot have Kalenjin warriors and the Mungiki 
sect armed and organised when new elections are held. 
Mungiki is not a legitimate interlocutor. Its structures 
should be disbanded and its leadership prosecuted, but 
reintegration processes have to be designed for its large, 
mostly urban and rural poor following. Such structures 
should not legitimise local criminals and undermine state 
authority, but they should provide concrete means for 
restoring state authority and legitimacy. An opportunity, 
with incentives, should be given for voluntary disarmament 
and dismantlement of all armed groups before the full 
arm of the law is brought to bear.  
3. Costs and punitive measures 
Fighting impunity 
Evidence to date suggests that atrocity crimes194 may 
have been committed in the violence that started on 29 
December 2007. The parties have already decided to 
establish an internationally supported truth, justice and 
reconciliation commission (TJRC) with a mandate to 
collect information on responsibility for that violence. In 
addition, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) has deployed a fact-finding 
mission to investigate allegations of grave human rights 
violations and will issue findings and recommendations 
including on appropriate accountability mechanisms.  
These measures are no guarantee against impunity or 
further atrocities, however. As an initial matter, the TJRC 
should be mandated to recommend a vetting mechanism 
to prevent any politician or civil servant found implicated 
in crimes against humanity or seriously involved in the 
violence that started on 29 December 2007 from holding 
any public office, pending the conclusion of criminal 
proceedings. Further, domestic and international pressure 
must ensure that those responsible for atrocity crimes are 
prosecuted. The UN Security Council should do its part 
by considering the report of the OHCHR mission and 
endorsing the accountability mechanisms proposed, 
including, if recommended, robust domestic justice 
processes.  
The International Criminal Court (ICC) also has a role to 
play. Because Kenya is a state party to the Rome Statute 
of the ICC, the Court has jurisdiction over atrocity crimes 
committed within the country or by its nationals.195 Both 
parties reportedly have taken their complaints to the ICC, 
and the Office of the Prosecutor has already made a 
statement noting that Kenya is a party to the statute and 
that it considers all alleged crimes within its jurisdiction 
regardless of the individuals or groups involved.196 The 
Prosecutor should take the next step and open a preliminary 
 
 
194 Crisis Group uses the term “atrocity crimes” advisedly, to 
refer to serious war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. The type of crime that mass atrocities amount to in 
any particular case is best left to prosecutors and judges. See 
Gareth Evans, “Genocide or crime? Actions speak louder than 
words in Darfur”, European Voice, 18 February 2005; also 
David Scheffer, “How to bring atrocity criminals to justice”, 
Financial Times, 2 February 2005. 
195 Though the ICC has jurisdiction, whether it ultimately 
proceeds against alleged perpetrators depends on whether 
Kenya’s own justice system is willing and able to carry out 
genuine investigations and prosecutions. The presumption and 
expectation is that a state party should have and make use of 
this opportunity. 
196 “Annan: Solution must be found in Kenya”, Associated 
Press, 22 January 2008. 
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examination, carefully considering the factual information 
gathered by the OHCHR. Such a move could at the very 
least deter any further atrocities should the negotiations 
falter. 
Sustaining the pressure  
The EU and the U.S. have threatened to cut aid due to 
concerns over the disputed election and the post-election 
violence. The EU has planned €383 million for the period 
2008-2013, but in response to events, the European 
Parliament voted to suspend this aid pending a satisfactory 
resolution of the crisis. The U.S. signed a statement with 
fourteen bilateral donors warning that there will be no 
“business as usual” until a political settlement is reached.197 
The World Bank and African Development Bank also 
stated that they are considering suspending or cutting 
some aid, which if it happened could severely affect 
development projects in the region.198  
In comparison to other countries in the region, Kenya is 
relatively independent of donor support, relying more on 
taxes, domestic borrowing and privatisation proceeds to 
fund its programs. Nevertheless, more than 40 per cent 
of its $2.3 billion development budget is funded by donor 
flows.199 The programs most likely to feel the effects of 
penalties are education,200 health and roads. In addition, 
the UK, the U.S., France, Italy and Germany control 
voting and veto rights in the IMF and World Bank.201 The 
disbursement of all international aid should be tied to 
progress in the transitional government’s implementation 
of the negotiated political and economic agenda. While 
 
 
197 Jaindi Kisero, “Aid cut by donors likely to result in budget 
shortfalls, financial instability”, The East African, 21 January 
2008. 
198 “As of January 2008, the World Bank’s portfolio in Kenya 
consists of 16 active operations (including a grant from the 
Global Environment Facility), with a total commitment of 
US$1,003.8 million. In addition, the Bank is financing three 
regional projects with a total investment of US$260 million for 
Kenya: the Transparency and Communications Infrastructure 
Project (US$114.4 million), the East Africa Trade and 
Transport Facilitation Project (US$120.6 million); and the 
Regional Trade Facilitation Project (US$25 million). Kenya 
will also benefit from a regional Southwest Indian Ocean 
Fisheries GEF grant”, World Bank Kenya, Projects and 
Programs, at www.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menu 
PK=356542&pagePK=141155&piPK=141124&theSitePK=3
56509. Paul Redfern, “World Bank may cut aid if no political 
solution is found”, The East African, 28 January 2008. 
199 Jaindi Kisero, “Aid cut by donors likely to result in budget 
shortfalls, financial instability”, The East African, 21 January 
2008.  
200 This would be particularly problematic, since the government 
has promised to pay public secondary school fees for students 
starting in 2008. 
201 Kisero, op. cit. 
one should not penalise those in the Kenyan community 
who least deserve it, it is important that international 
disapproval be clear and pressure be maintained: aid 
conditionality is one of the few mechanisms available 
for conveying that message. 
More importantly, international pressure applied to specific 
targeted individuals to end the violence and commit to 
the negotiation process needs to be sustained and increased. 
The U.S. sent letters informing thirteen individuals 
suspected of involvement in organising and supporting 
the violence that they risked visa denials for themselves 
and families. Thirty others are reportedly under investigation. 
Canada, the U.K., France and Switzerland all issued 
similar warnings. All EU member states and South Africa 
should adopt the same approach and raise the cost for 
those blocking the negotiation process. The wealth of 
many PNU hardliners depends on the capacity of their 
enterprises to raise funds on national, regional and 
international markets and the confidence of investors 
that they are trustworthy business partners. Revelations 
that they are under investigation for roles in the crisis and 
at risk of travel bans, asset freezes and prosecutions would 
make them international pariahs and increase pressure 
for them to abandon their hardline positions. 
There remain viable alternatives to ensure that the violence 
in Kenya remains contained. Further, the ranks of the army 
have so far has not been politicised. However, should 
peaceful alternatives fail, widespread violence resume 
and escalate, and the army be brought in by the government, 
there is no guarantee that the chain of command would 
be able to withstand internal divisions. The responsibility 
for protection of civilians against mass atrocities would 
then fall to the international community, perhaps through 
external intervention. The way to prevent such a scenario 
is to apply decisive pressure immediately and obtain a 
political settlement which will keep Kenya out of the list 
of countries requiring foreign peacekeeping operations 
to save the lives of its citizens.202 
 
 
202 The one-day visit of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice on 18 February 2008 was one such useful reinforcement of 
the efforts for a political settlement.  
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The current uneasy calm in Kenya should not be 
misunderstood as a return to normalcy. The protracted 
political crisis has deep roots and could easily lead to 
renewed extreme violence. More is at stake than the 
collapse of Kenya itself. Kenya is the platform for relief 
operations in Somalia and Sudan, a haven for refugees 
from throughout the region, a regional entrepot, and a 
key anchor for long-term stabilisation of Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi. Paralysis of its infrastructure would deprive 
those countries of access to basic commodities, reduce 
trade opportunities, hamper foreign investment and see 
economic growth crippled. The quicker a comprehensive 
solution to the crisis in Kenya is found, the better the 
prospects will be for the entire region. The alternative – 
a collapsed economy, the evisceration of the democratic 
process and ethnic and territorial conflict – would have 
severe consequences for the whole of east Africa, and 
well beyond.  
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 February 2008 
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